2018 CIVIL AFFAIRS SYMPOSIUM WORKSHOP REPORT

Optimizing the Civil Affairs Regiment for Echelons Above Brigade in Multi-Domain Operations
by Colonel (Ret.) Dennis J. Cahill

ISSUE PAPER

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by Major Mazi Markel & Sergeant First Class Max Steiner
Optimizing Civil Affairs

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THE CIVIL AFFAIRS ASSOCIATION
ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY
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Foreword
by Colonel (Ret.) Joseph P. Kirlin III

Executive Summary
by Colonel (Ret.) Christopher Holshek

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The 2018 Civil Affairs Symposium took place as part of the Civil Affairs (CA) Centennial week at Fort Bragg, NC. It was a seminal event in “strengthening the Regiment to secure the victory,” as the Association’s tagline reads.

Colonel Irvin Hunt’s report on post-World War I military government in the Rhineland marks the beginning of modern civil affairs. It also evokes many enduring issues in maturing this unique and vital strategic landpower capability into a fully-fledged member of the Army family. CA is not an accession branch and lacks unity of command for force management. It has no standing civil-military operations or CA staff section at the Joint Staff or Army Headquarters. And it has very limited and inconsistent organic CA staff expertise or civil-military capabilities at most geographic, service, operational or tactical commands—commands that have the responsibility to access reserve CA but remain encumbered by outdated Title 10 budget authorities for continuous as well as contingency operations.

With the Army’s renewed focus on readiness for major combat operations and increased lethality, the future of critical war-winning infrastructure like the U.S. Army Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) and capabilities such as CA is once again in doubt. Despite increased defense budgets and force ceilings, cuts in CA have taken place in the active conventional force, and Marine Reserve CA Groups cuts are currently underway. In going “back to the future” in warfighting doctrine, the nation must not continue to make the same post-Vietnam and pre-Iraq mistakes in funding, training, maintaining and sustaining this needed strategic warfighting capability and stability operations resource.

Major General Kurt Sonntag, Commander of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School/Special Operations Center of Excellence (USAJFKSWCS) —the “schoolhouse” for Army Special Operations and CA—was right when he stated at the 2017 CA Symposium that “the [CA] Regiment must do a better job of telling its story, beyond Army and Joint commands, on how it helps ‘secure the victory.’”

To address this, the CA Association has been constantly introducing and improving tools to tell the CA story through a unified narrative that advocates and identifies the many strategic and operational values-added of CA. This is done to inform and educate Army and joint commanders, policymakers (including members of Congress), partner organizations and the public and media.

In leveraging CA’s great legacy and growing importance to winning in the competition continuum, we must be unabashed in stating our case. The notes from our latest strategic communications briefing, for example, read: “CA helps commanders preserve their combat power and concentrate its lethality only when and where necessary—and make good on the blood and treasure they may have to employ on the nation’s behalf. In today’s wars of influence, CA is arguably the greatest strategic, operational and tactical economy-of-force capability a commander at any level can employ.”

In the November 2018 issue of Army Magazine, the CA Association summarized the Regiment’s centennial argumentum; a month earlier, it assisted civilian interagency partners in publishing an October 2018 Small Wars Journal article on CA’s critical civil-military integration role in defense support to stabilization. The new Professional Publications Advisory Board that the late Colonel Kurt Mueller initiated is especially helping younger members of the Regiment
to write for professional military journals in order to mainstream the discussion of CA into the discussion of the Army and Joint Force.

The iterative process events (such as the Symposium and Roundtable) and deliverables (such as the Issue Papers) have evolved into a much-needed intellectual platform, one that enables and informs as well as deepens and broadens the formal institutional processes for CA force development along the lines of policy, doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF-P). Now in its sixth year of advancing a more strategic and comprehensive understanding of CA, this process also contributes to what U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) commanding general Major General Darrell Guthrie called for as “a better learning organization.”

While the findings, opinions and recommendations of the following Issue Papers are representative of Regimental thinking, they do not represent official opinion of any kind. As a unique platform for the open exchange of ideas, they give voice to those with the greatest stake in the future of the most operationally experienced CA force in history, they help key military leaders to better understand and leverage CA and they promote collaboration with critical partners.

As a result, USAJFKSWCS and the CA Proponent have come to consider this platform an important source for Regimental input on CA force and doctrinal development; the Issue Papers are increasingly read at policy levels. Our process also enables dialogue on the critical aspect of interagency civil-military integration at institutional as well as operational levels under the Stabilization Assistance Review, described in Small Wars Journal. The Regimental leadership found this year’s papers particularly insightful, innovative, and thought-provoking. “The quality of these papers becomes better and better each year,” Issue Papers Committee Chairman Brigadier General, USA, Ret., Bruce Bingham affirmed.

“The [CA] Association, working closely with the Proponent, has really been a catalyst for change, sort of like a startup incubator. I haven’t seen anything similar in other military branches or government organizations,” issue paper author Major Shafi Saiduddin told us. “The Symposium and Issue Papers have given us missing context and language,” added fellow author Major Giancarlo Newsome.

As the Army Magazine article concluded, CA is coming of age, but it still has a long way to go. The future of our Regiment remains largely in the hands of its members, who actively engage in its development and advocate for it.

In addition to the contributions of USAJFKSWCS, the U.S. State and Defense Departments and the Agency for International Development, as well as various functional and regional commands, the Civil Affairs Association thanks the Association of the United States Army, with which it maintains a close relationship. It also thanks the Reserve Officers Association, the Foreign Area Officer Association, the Alliance for Peacebuilding and the U.S. Global Leadership Coalition for their continued partnerships.

A special thanks to Major General Sonntag, Commander USAJFKSWC, Major General Guthrie, Commander USACAPOC, Civil Affairs School Commandant, Colonel Jay Liddick, and other commanders for their leadership and impetus, as well as to the many at Fort Bragg—including 95th CA Brigade Commander Colonel Charles Burnett and Mr. Thomas Borton—who assisted in making the 2019 Centennial and Symposium a success.

Additional thanks go out to Major General Mike Kuehr, USA, Ret., Brigadier General Bruce B. Bingham, USA, Ret., Colonel Len Defrancisi, USMC, Colonel Larry Rubini, USA,
Ret., and especially to Nzinga A. Curry, Director of the Institute of Land Warfare, for their generous support of our publication process for this year’s volume.

Finally, our thanks go out to those working behind the scenes to put these programs and products together, to retired Colonels Christopher Holshek, Dennis Cahill and Mike Dudley, for organizing the program and venue and preparing the reports, as well as the writers of this year’s Issue Papers, and many others unmentioned.

We look forward to seeing you at our next meeting at the Roundtable in Washington, D.C., on 2 April 2019. To keep abreast of developments, to resource additional information and to join us as a member of the Civil Affair Association and the Association of the United States Army, visit us at www.civilaffairsassoc.org.

“Secure the Victory!”

Colonel Joseph P. Kirlin III, USA, Ret.
U.S. Army Civil Affairs
President
The Civil Affairs Association
The 2018 Civil Affairs (CA) Centennial and Symposium at Fort Bragg, NC, was a seminal event in “strengthening the Regiment to secure the victory,” as the Civil Affairs Association’s new tagline reads. The posthumous induction of Colonel Irvin Hunt as a Distinguished Member of the Civil Affairs Regiment was likewise timely. Hunt’s keystone analysis of the Army’s military government experience in the Rhineland after World War I led to CA doctrine, specialized personnel, units, training and education. Considered the beginning of modern civil affairs, it evoked many of the same issues in optimizing CA discussed in Army, Marine and Joint policy and doctrine, the Civil Affairs White Paper and the Civil Affairs Issue Papers.

Along with CA’s enduring values-added, many issues in maintaining this unique and vital strategic landpower capability today stretch back to that post-World War I era. The United States still struggles to translate battlefield successes into favorable and sustainable strategic outcomes, and its forces continue to grapple with difficult operating environments of political ambiguity and operational complexity across what is now called the “competition continuum.” This includes the consolidation of security and military gains into political and civil outcomes at strategic, operational and tactical levels in support of major combat operations.

Now, as then, this requires continuous investment in an innovative and adaptive force, well-networked in planning and operational relationships, and persistently-engaged and regionally-aligned to facilitate political-military goals and objectives. The focus of the Symposium, the workshop and presented papers was, therefore, on how the Regiment can organize, train, educate and resource its forces—well beyond standard military program requirements—to shape human security environments and help the United States, its allies and its partners prevail in the years to come. Whether for special or conventional force operations, the active or reserve CA Soldier or Marine must be a joint force, Army or Marine command subject matter expert on civil factors that affect the military mission.

“In the 2018 National Defense Strategy,” Regimental Ball speaker Lieutenant General Francis Beaudette, commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, stated “the Secretary of Defense charged the Department to out-think, out-maneuver, out-partner, and out-innovate revisionist powers, rogue regimes, terrorists, and other threat actors. . . . [He] specifically directed that we further integrate with the U.S. interagency, counter coercion and subversion, strengthen alliances and attract new partners, and foster a competitive mindset. The Civil Affairs Regiment plays a significant and distinct role in tomorrow’s fight. We need you prepared, educated, and trained in governance, reconnaissance, relationship building, and the influence methods of our adversaries. Continue to build networks of human and physical infrastructure around the globe. You will be on the front lines of tomorrow’s influence battles. Stay ready.”

Given the latest crossroads at which CA finds itself—a century after the Hunt Report—policy and force stakeholders must re-examine and re-explain CA values-added for current times, in ways that can be universally understood. From the many commands and country teams with which he interacts, Beaudette observed that their unanimous conclusion is that they “want more civil affairs teams, now.” Despite the increased demand signals, defense budgets and force ceilings, service cuts in CA are nearing pre-9/11 levels and may go beyond that. Two-thirds of active conventional CA is already gone; reduction of Marine Reserve CA Groups by as much as one-half is also underway.
Much of this continuous cognitive disconnect stems from what former National Security Council official Dr. Nadia Schadlow calls “American denial syndrome.” Based on her book, *War & the Art of Governance*, and on her own experiences, Dr. Schadlow explained in the 2019 Symposium keynote presentation the reluctance of American civil and military institutions to invest and engage in stabilization, “nation-building,” and other activities not considered part of major combat operations. She attributed this tendency to four elements of U.S. strategic culture:

1. discomfort with the idea of the military taking the lead in political activities;
2. concerns about a U.S. version of (neo)colonialism;
3. the view that civilians should take the lead in governance operations; and
4. American views about what constitutes war and the military profession, based on a narrow interpretation of Clausewitz.

Some of her findings reinforced the conclusions of former National Security Advisor Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster, USA, Ret., keynote speaker at the 2015 CA Symposium in San Antonio. At that event, he pointed out that civil-military integration was a critical component to the effective conduct of U.S. interagency stabilization operations.

Dr. Schadlow noted there was some progress in addressing these dilemmas. For example, the Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR), though somewhat flawed in her view, did reflect a greater appreciation of the linkages between political outcomes and military force. Dr. Schadlow also lauded the SAR’s observation that stabilization was “a political endeavor involving an integrated civilian-military process to create conditions where locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict and prevent a resurgence of violence.” In addition, she observed that over the past decade, there has been much greater appreciation for the critical role of local actors—as evidenced by the growing concept of operating “by, with and through,” especially among military actors.

She also praised the development of the concept of campaigning beyond joint to interagency levels. “Rather than attempting to impose a false dichotomy of peace or war, or to assume an artificially static environment that can be broken into discreet campaigns with fixed end state,” the new joint concept for integrated campaigning “recognizes the need for proactive, on-going campaigning that adjusts to fluid policy environments and changing conditions to create favorable and sustainable outcomes.”

In her conclusion, Dr. Schadlow urged that ongoing diplomacy, development and defense collaboration concentrate on developing concrete operational models for integrated actions, especially along civil-military lines and incorporating conditions-based approaches.

Picking up where Dr. Schadlow left off, the civilian interagency panel looked at how the Regiment can optimize its capabilities to best facilitate and support interagency stabilization and civilian-led peace-building. This point was made in a hallmark article published just before the Symposium in the *Small Wars Journal* on “A New U.S. Framework for Stabilization: Opportunities for Civil Affairs.” Moderated by Mr. Ryan McCannell from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the panel included Mr. Jason Ladnier from the U.S. State Department Bureau of Conflict & Stabilization Operations; Mr. Stephen Lennon, Director of USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI); and Ms. Diana Parzik, Acting Division Chief for Plans and Policy in USAID’s Office of Civil-Military Cooperation. The civilian panelists stressed the SAR as a seminal “point of departure” and concurred with Dr. Schadlow’s general observation on the need for integrated interagency planning for conditions-based approaches to stabilization.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The SAR has already garnered significant interest and enthusiasm in the executive and legislative branches as well as among interorganizational partners. “Now comes the hard part of trying to translate that momentum into lasting reforms,” the Small Wars Journal article concluded. “As this process moves forward, the Civil Affairs Regiment can lead the way by integrating new approaches at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.”

The civilian panelists’ comments—and their very presence at the Symposium—reinforced the article’s contention that, “as the national strategic capability for civil-military transition and conflict management within DoD, civil affairs is the natural partner for State and USAID civilian stabilization efforts” and “an indispensible strategic conflict management capability for U.S. interagency, Joint, and Army missions across the full range of operations.” While such collaboration represents “a significant opportunity” for the Regiment to elevate its profile and renew its capabilities,” this requires “fundamentally new ways of thinking about how civil affairs and other DoD elements work alongside State, USAID and other civilian partners; how DoD structures security cooperation with host-nation security partners; and how the U.S. government ultimately measures and defines success.”

Among the main opportunities is the institutionalization of interagency planning relationships, with CA planners incorporated into country-level stabilization planning to support desired political outcomes, identify common theories of change and to sequence diplomatic, development and security activities. Per the recently-released DoD Directive 3000.05, Stabilization, 13 December 2018, “(s)tabilization must be incorporated into planning across all lines of effort for military operations as early as possible to shape operational design and strategic decisions.” It adds that “DoD’s core responsibility during stabilization is to support and reinforce the civilian efforts of the USG lead agencies consistent with available statutory authorities. . . .”

Likewise, CA training and education must include greater treatment of interagency stabilization capabilities, organization and authorities. Civil-military integration, the Small Wars Journal article contended, “needs to be standardized through integrated civil-military training and exercises, standard operating procedures, and updated doctrine” to facilitate integrated planning, align resources, build a common operating picture and enable interoperability.

To those ends, the panel suggested that the Civil Affairs Proponent’s current review of CA core competencies should consider how they can reinforce comparative advantages and minimize overlapping functions with State and USAID capabilities. For example, the renewed emphasis on adversaries’ (mis)use of information and influence in what is increasingly being called “narrative warfare” presents a direct challenge to CA and its partner organizations as they attempt to manage, share and deploy information tools and techniques in theater. “Merging Civil Information Management (CIM) capabilities and functions, especially to ensure information is available on unclassified systems,” the interagency article posed, “will play a critical role in building a common operating picture.”

The SAR also articulates the need to have civilian experts on the ground working alongside CA to enable a unified, civilian-led and conditions-based approach that appropriately layers and sequences security and non-security assistance. The experiences of the Syria Transition Assistance Response Team–Forward and close civil-military collaboration on the ground in Somalia have provided a few good tests for this “co-deployment” concept, which civilian agencies are working to formalize and improve upon for future contingencies.

Another growing area of opportunity for high-impact CA support to stabilization is in promoting civilian resilience. “CA forces must seek to understand and engage civil society.
networks,” Issue Paper candidate Captain Nicholas Ashley wrote in a post-Symposium Small Wars Journal article, “working by, with, and through civil society [i.e., peace-building] organizations to prevent, manage, and end conflict.” To have this transformative capability at any echelon and during any phase of an operation “will require cultural and cognitive shifts that require CA forces to adopt a new paradigm for thinking about and conducting operations,” Ashley added. This is a growing insight for the Civil Affairs Branch Proponent at the U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center & School (USAJFKSWCS) as well as its counterpart at the (NATO) Civil-Military Cooperation Center of Excellence, also represented at the Symposium.

Concomitant to the challenge of supporting interagency stabilization and interorganizational cooperation, the Regiment’s capabilities must nevertheless “focus on helping the Army achieve its priorities and objectives,” said Colonel Jay Liddick, CA Proponent Commandant, in his luncheon remarks. “We are in a time of great vulnerability, but also [have] a great opportunity to help the Army solve its problems. In all our products, and in our [upcoming] force modernization assessment, we must be able to explain and demonstrate exactly how civil affairs capability enables a commander to succeed in accomplishing his or her mission across the full range of military operations.”

His remarks echo the CA Association’s updated strategic communications brief, which states that, given CA’s legacy and growing importance to gray zone conflict and people-centric warfare in great as well as small power competition, “CA helps commanders preserve their combat power and concentrate their lethality only when and where necessary—and make good on the blood and treasure they must invest on the Nation’s behalf. In today’s wars of influence, CA is arguably the greatest strategic, operational, and tactical economy-of-force capability a commander at any level employs.”

As Beaudette did, Liddick reflected on how CA is unique to the joint force and the Army in its natural ability to operate in partner nation, interagency and multinational settings critical to stabilization. The approved and published Civil Affairs: 2025 and Beyond White Paper explains how Army (and Marine) CA forces are DoD’s “primary human geography-focused capability to understand and engage civil populations and agencies across domains by applying unique knowledge, skills, and abilities . . . across the competition continuum in joint and multinational operations that include military engagement, security cooperation, deterrence, crisis response, limited contingency operations, large-scale ground combat operations, operations in dense urban environments, and defense support to stabilization.”

Liddick also agreed with the capstone article in the November issue of Army Magazine that CA is most effective “when appropriately leveraged through geographic combatant and service component commands, among their main customers in the regions [where] they operate,” adding emphasis to CA’s support for the land component. “We must aggressively pursue enhancing our capabilities to ensure we constantly deliver for the Army,” he said, adding that CA is an essential capability in each of the Army’s four strategic roles (shape, prevent, prevail in large scale combat operations and consolidate gains). He added that CA professionals must know how the Army sees its future in order to see their own.

The Army Vision describes the lines of effort for the Army to achieve its vision by 2028. “The Total Army will build readiness, modernize concepts and capabilities, reform processes and strengthen our alliances and partnerships to ensure land power dominance on any battlefield, against any threat at any time.” The Army Strategy adds that “the Army of 2028 will be ready to deploy, fight and win decisively against any adversary, anytime and anywhere, in a
joint, combined, multi-domain, high-intensity conflict, while simultaneously deterring others
and maintaining its ability to conduct irregular warfare.”

Along with the National Security Strategy co-penned by Dr. Schadlow, the new National
Defense Strategy and The Army Vision, The Army Strategy is a source document for the US-
AJFKSWCS capabilities assessment of the CA Regiment. It also sources the Army 2028 Ech-
elons Above Brigade in Multi-Domain Operations assessment, U.S. Army Training and Doc-
trine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-8, U.S. Army Concept: Multi-Domain Combined
Arms Operations at Echelons Above Brigade 2025–2045 and Civil Affairs: 2025 and Beyond,
the new CA White Paper.

Leading the Symposium’s input to the process, USAJFKSWCS Director of Affairs Force
Modernization Colonel Dennis J. Cahill, USA, Ret., convened the afternoon military panel
reporting back on the workshop conducted the previous day on “Optimizing the Civil Affairs
Regiment for Echelons Above Brigade in Multi-Domain Operations—Development of DOT-
MLPF-P [doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, education and policy] Relat-
ed Findings and Recommendations for Upcoming Civil Affairs Force Modernization Assess-
ment.” Based on the source documents above, the workshop framed the discussion around the
following imperatives:

• Sustain CA competence in irregular warfare while being “ready to deploy, fight, and win
decisively in a joint, multi-domain, high-intensity conflict…” per The Army Vision;
• understand the new campaign construct known as the “competition continuum,” which
replaces the long-used and well-known joint phasing construct;
• identify the Army’s four strategic roles as shape security environments, prevent conflict,
prevail in large scale ground combat operations, and consolidate gains;
• redefine the roles of CA at each echelon, in particular at conventional force echelons
above brigade, and modify CA structures to effectively execute those roles; and
• integrate with interorganizational partners at all echelons and across the competition
continuum.

The required capabilities of the Civil Affairs Regiment, the workshop determined, are essen-
tially threefold:
1. Provide a multi-domain capable CA force in and below armed conflict;
2. Provide civil knowledge integration (as opposed to civil information management),
especially at operational and regional strategic levels; and
3. Understand, influence, develop and employ local, regional and trans-regional civil
networks.

The third capability is required at all levels and should be integrated closely with interagen-
cy, allied, and civilian interorganizational partners. The three breakout working groups, based
on these capabilities, also agreed that, especially at the tactical level, civil reconnaissance and
engagement to map human networks are critical capabilities regardless of mission along the
competition continuum. In addition to this main insight, the breakout sessions identified de-
tailed required capabilities at each echelon, as discussed in the “Symposium Workshop Report”
in this publication.

Cahill briefed this to the panelists, who included: Major General Darrell Guthrie,
Commander, U.S. Army Civil Affairs & Psychological Operations Command (Airborne)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Given continuous resource constraints, the CA force is not likely to get bigger—that means the Regiment must optimize its force in every way possible.

Following the consensus of CACOM commanders on the overriding importance of maintaining regional relevancy, the panel noted how General Vince Brooks, USA, Ret., had seen the value of CA in Korea, creating a C9 and testing the Army system to bring U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) CA forces forward. This deserves closer examination at the Army level.

The SAR policy provides a workable framework on how to leverage CA’s key capabilities for interagency planning, coordination, collaboration, synchronization, management and assessment. But there also need to be interagency agreements that address the sharing of assessment results and the civilian skill sets required in post-conflict, as well as inter-service agreements that formalize CA support to other services and a DoD “clearing house” capability to determine which CA capability (special operations forces, conventional forces, active component or reserve component, i.e., SOF, CF, AC or RC) to apply to a given problem set.

Special Forces Group commanders value CA the most for civil reconnaissance, civil engagement and interagency civil-military integration.

Picking up on the Commandant’s remarks, the panel appreciated how the unique diversity and blend of active and reserve CA resources provides the best possible capabilities base for effective civil-military operations in every situation—recommending, in fact, that both components are vital across the entire competition continuum. Active CA units can deploy for quick response and provide ground assessments to determine follow-on support, whereas reserve CA units can be tasked to provide the technical civilian knowledge, skills and abilities that they possess or access that are not resident in the active force.

While both the Army and Marine Corps provide tactical CA capabilities, only the Army provides operational and strategic capabilities such as Theater CA Planning Teams, Civil-Military Support Elements (which support U.S. country teams) and functional specialists. Most of them are in the USAR under USACAPOC(A), which provides 85 percent of the Regiment and faces a unique challenge in meeting what Brigadier General Coggin calls a “full-time requirement from a part-time force.” In addition to the focus on operational readiness, Major General Guthrie is looking to turn his globally engaged force into “more of a learning organization.”

In response to the question on the main structural change to make in the Regiment, the panel concluded that CA must be both multi-component and expeditionary. “Multi-component” closes gaps between the parts of the force that can be applied to short- and long-term, tactical as well as more strategic problems—i.e., the need for the active and reserve portions of the force to work more in tandem. “Expeditionary” means a force with a self-deployment capability, always ready to do what only the CA force can do.

The Symposium culminated with the presentation of the five papers selected to appear in this publication and to compete for cash prizes based on an audience vote. The papers both
supported and enriched the main findings, assumptions and recommendations of the Symposium well beyond expectations. The military panel in particular was impressed with their creativity, analysis and resourcefulness, from broad considerations of a CA force restructuring and force rebranding to applicable lessons learned on the ground in Africa deployments on interagency cooperation. Along with the “Symposium Workshop Report,” their findings and recommendations are most worthy of consideration not just by the CA proponent to inform force modernization efforts as the Army builds toward Army 2028, but also by major Army commands such as TRADOC, the Army Futures and Forces Commands and at the Army and Joint Staff and Office of Secretary of Defense levels.

The Army Magazine article—cited on page 12—stated: “The values-added of civil affairs have grown dramatically in an era of gray zone conflict, people-centric warfare, and great as well as small power competition over influence. . . . Given the nature of conflict and competition [that] the Army must contend with, CA’s part of the Army’s strategic roles is only coming of age.” There is still much unfinished business in maturing it into fully-fledged member of the Army family. CA is still not an accession branch and it lacks unity of command for force management. A century after the Hunt Report, there is still no standing Civil-Military Operations (CMO) or CA staff section at the Joint Staff or Army Headquarters, nor is there an organic CA/CMO staff or plans capability at any major geographic, service, operational or tactical command. These commands still try to access reserve CA with outdated Title 10 budget authorities for contingency versus continuous operations.

CA must continue to evolve and adapt to changing national and Army imperatives; but, any reconfiguration of CA forces must consider its strategic, operational and tactical roles as well as cross-continuum contributions and capabilities. It must also exploit the CA Regiment’s human capital as the most operationally experienced CA force in its first hundred years.

Moreover, the CA Regiment itself must continue to do a better job of telling its story, beyond Army and joint commands, delineating how they help to secure the victory. The warning that Major General Kurt Sonntag, USAJFKSWCS Commander, gave the Regiment last year was prescient: “We need to break our paradigm of silent professionals and start messaging to our civilian decisionmakers, DoD leaders, interagency partners, and to our Army, the utility of the CA professionals who do yeoman’s work in every phase of military operations and all corners of the globe.”

The next step in this continuous journey will be at the Civil Affairs Roundtable on 2 April 2019 at the D.C. National Guard Armory.

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Colonel Christopher Holshek, USA, Ret., a Program Director in the Civil Affairs Association, is a co-organizer of the Symposia and Roundtables and co-edits the Civil Affairs Issue Papers. He is a 2017 Distinguished Member of the Civil Affairs Regiment. His book, Travels with Harley—Journeys in Search of Personal and National Identity, reflects experiences and insights gained from three decades in CA at all levels and across the full competition continuum and in the joint, interorganizational, multinational and multi-domain environment.
Workshop Overview

On 2 November 2018, the Civil Affairs Association hosted a workshop led by members of the Civil Affairs (CA) Force Modernization (FM) Directorate from the CA Commandant’s office. They focused on the theme, “Optimizing the Civil Affairs Regiment for Echelons Above Brigade in Multi-Domain Operations.” The purpose of this workshop was to identify the CA capabilities required to support Army 2028 conventional force (CF) echelons above brigade (EAB) and special operations force (SOF) echelons above battalion. The workshop briefed its results the following day to a military panel that included senior CA commanders and a representative from the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The first portion of the three-hour workshop consisted of a review of strategic and conceptual documents that impact the way the future CA force will be organized, manned, trained and equipped in the Army of 2028. The second portion consisted of a breakout session in which all attendees broke into three groups to consider required capabilities, drawn from the recently published Civil Affairs: 2025 and Beyond White Paper (CAWP), and how those capabilities should be arrayed across CF, EAB and SOF echelons above battalion for multi-domain operations (MDO). These working groups briefed their efforts in a plenary session and the CA FM Directorate captured them for use in the military panel the following day. The workshop efforts results and the outcome of the military panel will be used to inform a Force Modernization Assessment in calendar year 2019 designed to develop doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities and policy (DOTMLPF-P) solutions for the future CA force.

The following summary captures the major points of the workshop presentations, breakout session and panel discussion from the 2018 Civil Affairs Symposium.

Workshop Presentations

Colonel Dennis J. Cahill, USA, Ret., Director of the CA FM Directorate of the CA Propo- nent opened and moderated the workshop. After describing the Army’s current focus on building the Army of 2028, he presented selected figures and passages from the following strategic and conceptual documents:

- *The National Security Strategy*;
- *The National Defense Strategy*;
- *The Army Vision* and *The Army Strategy*;
- U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations, 2028, 27 September 2018, Initial Coordination Draft v0.7k*;
All of these documents are available for download on the CA Association website under “Research Resources.” Common themes identified in these documents include:

- Sustaining our competence in irregular warfare while being “ready to deploy, fight, and win decisively in a joint, multi-domain, high-intensity conflict. . . .” (The Army Vision). On this point, irregular warfare includes counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency and stability operations. Multi-domain refers to the domains of air, land, maritime, space and cyberspace.

- Understanding the new campaign construct known as the “competition continuum,” which replaces the long-used and well-known joint phasing construct. The competition continuum used by the Army consists of competition below armed conflict, armed conflict and return to competition below armed conflict. It was noted that the Joint Construct for Integrated Campaigning, from which this continuum was adopted, includes cooperation before competition below armed conflict.

- Identifying the Army’s four strategic roles as shape security environments, prevent conflict, prevail in large scale ground combat operations (LSGCO), and consolidate gains.

- Retaining CF EAB formations as Theater Army (TA), Field Army (FA), Corps, and Division and the corresponding SOF echelons above battalion formations below geographic combatant command (GCC) as Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC), Special Operations Joint Task Force (SOJTF), and Special Operations Task Force (SOTF). The roles of each echelon are being redefined; this requires a modification in structures to effectively execute those roles.

- Integrating with inter-organizational partners at all echelons and across the competition continuum.

The review of strategic and conceptual documents was followed by a brief overview of the CAWP. The brief highlighted two key conceptual changes: a redefinition of terms that clarifies roles of CA forces and better link CA activities to maneuver force planning and execution of MDO; and the need to recalibrate the total CA force for forward presence and expeditionary missions in cooperation, competition and armed conflict.

The brief also informed workshop participants that MDO will focus the force in a new way to understand, anticipate, shape and exploit the changing conditions of human geography. CA will move beyond civil information management and consider civil knowledge integration with inter-organizational partners and intelligence counterparts to promote more comprehensive situational understanding in all operations. The idea of developing and employing local, regional and transregional civil networks requires a more comprehensive, multi-disciplinary and scientific approach by culturally-relevant, language-proficient and politically-astute CA Soldiers.

**Breakout Sessions**

The workshop attendees then divided themselves into three working groups that each looked at a set of required capabilities (RCs) from the CAWP: provide an MDO-capable CA force in and below armed conflict; conduct Civil Knowledge Integration; and develop and employ local, regional and transregional civil networks. They applied these RCs to the CF EAB
formations (TA, FA, Corps and Division) and the SOF echelons above battalion formations (GCC, TSOC, SOJTF and SOTF).

Working from the tactical to theater strategic levels, the workgroup findings that will inform later work to design the next CA force are summarized as follows.

At Division/SOTF (tactical), CA forces require the ability to:

• Conduct civilian reconnaissance and civil engagement to map human networks.
• Shape the tactical human security environment. This includes organizing and leveraging local political, economic, social, etc., resources against threats and challenges to economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security. In other words, this means countering adversary actions that promote instability by supporting partner actions that promote resilience and stabilization.
• Unify military and civilian partner efforts in these areas in persistent and expeditionary operations.

At Corps/SOJTF (tactical/operational), CA forces require the ability to:

• Integrate into planning and targeting through organizations, processes and technology.
• Identify and process civil information requirements up, down and laterally.
• Resource civil-military requirements (including military government specialists) at the right time and place across the Corps/SOJTF area of operations in persistent and expeditionary operations. This may require more formal and persistent partnerships exemplified by civil-military teams of CA and inter-organizational partners that are fully integrated before and during operational deployments. This goes beyond exchanging liaisons and sharing pre-and post-deployment briefs.

At FA/TA/TSOC (operational/theater strategic), CA forces require similar capabilities to those required at Corps/SOJTF for planning, targeting, civil information requirements and resourcing civil-military requirements—particularly as they relate to theater campaign and contingency planning, setting the theater and managing persistent and expeditionary requirements for CA forces and inter-organizational partners. In addition, CA forces require the ability to:

• Provide mission command over assigned and attached CA forces and others in a general support role and in geographically defined areas, such as dense urban terrain.
• Integrate FA, TA and TSOC headquarters with country teams, U.S. government departments and agencies, host nation governments and other inter-organizational partners to achieve U.S. national objectives and for burden-sharing.

At GCC (theater strategic), CA forces require the ability to:

• Conduct critical civil resource and infrastructure gap analysis for the theater.
• Coordinate and resource persistent and expeditionary CA forces as well as program inter-organizational contributions for operations across the competition continuum.
• Facilitate inter-organizational command and control, information sharing and situational understanding across and among theaters.

It was noted that the CA force requirements at GCC must be expanded to the National Capital Region. As discussed in past forums, there remains a critical gap in senior CA presence in the Pentagon.
Panel Discussion

At the Symposium plenary session the next day, Colonel Cahill, USA, Ret., briefed the results of the previous day’s workshop to the military panel. Panel discussion feedback generally confirmed the workshop recommendations and provided additional points of consideration. The following is a short list of some of the panel member comments:

- “Given continuous resource constraints, the CA force is not likely to expand. As Winston Churchill once said, ‘We are out of money; now we must think’”;
- “As a CACOM [Civil Affairs Command] commander the most important thing is relevancy. In 34 months, my biggest challenge is that we have been asked to do more without getting more, including ‘AC [active component] things’”;
- “General Brooks saw the value of CA in Korea; he created a C9 and tested the Army system to bring U.S. Army Reserve CA forces forward. This command, control and coordination model deserves examination at the Army level”;
- “Although required by DoD [the Department of Defense], there are no inter-service agreements that formalize CA support to other services. Who is working that in the Pentagon?”;
- “We also need inter-agency agreements that address the sharing of assessment results and the civilian skill sets required in post-conflict”;
- “There is currently no ‘clearing house’ capability to determine which CA capability [SOF, CF, AC, RC (reserve component)] to apply to a given problem set”;
- “The Stabilization Assistance Review is a 3D (defense, diplomacy and development) policy on how to conduct business; the CA force has key capabilities for inter-agency planning, coordination, collaboration, synchronization, management and assessment at all levels”; and
- “Special Forces Group commanders value CA for civil reconnaissance, civil engagement and inter-agency civil-military integration.”

The panel discussion elicited the question: “If there were one structure change you could make, what would it be and why?” The panel gave two responses: multi-component and expeditionary. Multi-component closes gaps between the part of the force that can be applied to a problem for 365 days per year versus the part of the force that can be applied 39 days per year (i.e., the AC and RC portions of the force must work in tandem). Expeditionary means having a force with a self-deployment capability that is ready at all times to do what only the CA force can do—civil reconnaissance, civil engagement and building civilian networks/relationships to shape, influence and validate conditions and behavior in the human component of the land domain.

Cahill also highlighted a related action that the CA proponent was concurrently working with (TRADOC) and Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) in which the CA proponent had identified several gaps in the planned EAB formations, in current CA formations and in some policy areas that need to be addressed as the Army builds Army 2028. Examples of these shortfalls included the following.

At strategic, operational and tactical warfighting headquarters:

- Insufficient organic CA/Civil-Military Operations staff at each echelon;
  - no organic CA units at each echelon;
  - no inter-organizational integration capability at each echelon; and
- no capability to simultaneously plan, coordinate and execute irregular warfare during LSGCO.

- Within current CA formations:
  - Insufficient AC forces for current operations in periods of competition;
  - CA forces at echelon configured in 2005 for modularity not compatible for requirements in MDO; and
  - Insufficient capability and capacity for support to civil authority (SCA) and transitional military authority (TMA) across the competition continuum—preferably in fully organized and integrated civil-military teams.

- Additional comments:
  - HQDA must address future mobilization and rotation policies to maximize access to reserve component CA forces; and
  - HQDA must fully resource the Institute for Military Support to Governance in Total Army Analysis 21-25 to fix the gaps associated with SCA and TMA.

**Conclusion**

Once again, the workshop and subsequent panel discussion brought a diverse group of people together from across the CA community of interest. The issues discussed and the feedback received from this group touched on critical topics related to concepts and capability development, experimentation, doctrine, training development, personnel management and policies regarding the role of Civil Affairs forces at EAB in MDO. This report will be used by the CA proponent to inform force modernization efforts in Fiscal Year 2019 as the Army builds toward Army 2028.

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The Evolution of Civil Affairs and Interagency Partnerships in Sub-Saharan Africa
by Ryan McCannell

Introduction
This paper explores the maturation of working relationships between Civil Affairs (CA) and other U.S. Government (USG) agency representatives in the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) area of responsibility (AoR) since the Command’s inception in 2007. It draws data from more than 40 off-the-record personal interviews with U.S. Army and Marine Corps CA personnel; civilian representatives of the Department of State (DoS), DoD and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) who have served in Africa; and, from non-government organization (NGO) representatives at work in sub-Saharan Africa. These conversations, augmented by U.S. military doctrine and other sources, describe a CA effort that has evolved substantially over the past decade. CA has become a well-respected, if not always perfectly aligned, conduit for civilian-military collaboration in Africa. After tracing this evolving relationship across the array of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities and policy (DOTMLPF-P) factors, the paper concludes with recommendations for strengthening the CA community’s future interagency relationships.

Analysis and Discussion: Early Mistakes and Skeptical Partners
The contemporary history of CA in Africa began in the mid-2000’s, with the shift in U.S. strategic attention toward the region due to concerns about terrorism, state fragility and pandemic health threats.1 Like many other elements of the U.S. military, CA forces had to adjust from the kinetic, military-dominated environments in Iraq and Afghanistan to the diplomatic and development-centered orientation of U.S. embassy country teams in most of Africa. A 2010 report on CA in East Africa noted “stark differences between CA operations and functions in . . . kinetic settings versus those of the [Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) area of operations], particularly with respect to the military’s interactions with sovereign host nation governments and the role of the State Department as the lead U.S. agency in each country.”2 Other civilian interlocutors cited a lack of strategic coherence in CA activities, leading to difficulty understanding how CA teams intended to contribute to whole-of-government objectives, and where CA’s own activities might overlap with those of civilian agencies. Observers ranging from the Government Accountability Office to individual embassy officials described an initial lack of cultural awareness and a blasé attitude toward such coordination in those early days. These observations, although unflattering, serve as a baseline for measuring the Regiment’s progress in improving interagency relationships during the past decade.

CA’s adjustment to the continent coincided with generalized skepticism among civilians about the impact of the newly-created AFRICOM in 2007 and the growing operational tempo of Special Operations Forces activities aimed at disrupting or destroying the region’s emerging terrorist networks. As a DoS official recalled, “In the Africa region . . . except for CJTF-HOA, there was not a history of civ-mil engagement, and the negative reaction in Africa [to AFRICOM] did not help. I perceived a latent, negative perspective of the military in the [DoS]
Africa Bureau, stemming from Gitmo, Abu Ghraib, Iraq and other public relations disasters. That skepticism remained despite a series of good AFRICOM commanders who played well with interagency and regional partners. A representative of a leading peacebuilding organization stated: “For a lot of NGOs, the Afghanistan experience left them feeling used, and wary of future military interactions.”

A senior active-duty CA officer noted that the CA community was also in flux: “That was a point of inflection; we were just developing and standing up the 95th CA Brigade, Civil-Military Engagement (CME), and a whole crop of newly-trained CA personnel. From our interagency colleagues, we encountered basic questions about the roles we each have—specifically, why are you in our lane?” Another senior CA officer remarked, “The CME program tried to answer these questions; we went from avoiding harm and de-confliction to collaboration. In Mali, USAID originally didn’t even want to talk to us. Eventually, with access and money, people saw our potential.” Similarly, several CA Reservists who served in the CJTF-HOA region described significant challenges in consolidating a durable role for CA in the wake of successive commanders whose views on civil-military coordination, as well as levels of familiarity with CA, varied widely.

CA’s Evolution Toward Better Collaboration in Africa

A decade later, CA has evolved significantly toward more effective collaboration with its principal interagency and NGO partners in Africa. This section summarizes those observations through the DOTMLPF-P rubric.

**Doctrine.** Generally speaking, CA’s unified action partners in Africa have experienced the impact of doctrine while developing rules of engagement with CA with respect to civil reconnaissance, civil engagement, civil information management (CIM) and CA-supported activities such as foreign assistance. On a continent where economic and political progress tends to oscillate between advances and backsliding, consolidating gains is a long-term, whole-of-government endeavor for the United States and its like-minded partners. Moreover, the recent spike in Chinese economic, diplomatic and military engagement has spurred concerns about the return of great-power competition in Africa along multiple elements of national power. Fortunately, the “U.S. Africa Command recognizes it is part of a diverse U.S. government interagency team that reflects the talents, expertise, and capabilities within the entire U.S. government.”

However, most existing doctrine, which defines CA competencies and functions in purely military terms, does not translate well in these contexts. Since many CA activities closely resemble civilian development assistance projects, CA teams initially encountered unforeseen resistance from DoS and USAID colleagues whose ongoing programs depend on substantial problem analysis, diplomatic engagement with host nation governments and decades of past experience working in African operational environments. Gradually, by feeding their operations into holistic country-team strategies, processes and relationships, CA teams have reduced the friction inherent to civilian-military coordination.

Recent positive examples include CA operations in Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda and USAID’s West Africa Mission in Accra, Ghana—all contexts in which security challenges nest within a Title 22 (that is, civilian-led) interagency environment. In these countries, CA teams have made efforts to invest in coordination relationships, vetted their assistance projects with USAID, and remained sensitive to the U.S. embassies’ diplomatic and political objectives. Not surprisingly, their civilian counterparts view CA quite positively in these settings. In contrast, those CA teams that have interpreted too narrowly the doctrinal
injunction that “all actions planned, programmed or undertaken by CA must be tied to the commander’s objectives and directly support unified land operations” or risk “reduc[ing] the effectiveness of U.S. operations and misus[ing] finite resources” have not fared as well in the eyes of civilian partners. While this may sound obvious, AFRICOM’s strategic approach of working by, with and through civilian agencies and partner nations actually complicates the challenge of discerning the commander’s intent from whatever the country team determines it to be.

A key weakness of CA doctrine is dearth of guidance it provides in these contexts. Even the updated U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations, focuses overwhelmingly on CA’s contribution during or after military operations, rather than in the steady-state, Title 22 environments now common in the AFRICOM AoR and other world regions. In the words of CA Major Thomas Geisinger, writing more generally about the evolution of the Regiment, “Since . . . 2006, CA teams have found a new utility, augmenting U.S. diplomatic efforts . . . with the aim of helping to prevent and deter conflict in failed and threatened states. Unfortunately, the history of CA doctrine and training do not correlate with its new means of peacetime employment.” For example, FM 3-57 does not address the often tricky challenge of balancing the directives of the U.S. ambassador with the orders or intent of a distant commander. As a result, a Civil Military Support Element (CMSE) “operating in a Title 22 zone normally has several ‘masters’ who may or may not have convergent priorities.” CA forces in Africa have had to learn how to manage these tricky relationships through trial and error—in spite of their doctrine, not because of it.

Organization. Virtually every person interviewed for this paper, whether civilian or military, noted that the short deployment cycle of CA forces creates an organizational obstacle to inter-agency partnership—“short” being relative to most multi-year Foreign Service assignments to steady-state, family-accompanied posts. To be clear, deployment-to-dwell ratios are well beyond the scope of this paper: they reflect painful lessons about the fundamentally human limits of service and sacrifice during the long war on terror, not to mention the challenges of balancing civilian-military livelihoods for CA Reservists. Nevertheless, for their civilian counterparts, investing in relationships with rapidly rotating CA personnel can seem like a no-win situation. On the one hand, DoS and USAID officials who make a concerted effort to engage and mentor CA personnel soon see those individuals re-deploy and replaced in a few months by a new cadre of CA personnel starting at square one. On the other hand, civilian agency counterparts who opt to ignore CA forfeit opportunities to collaborate and inform CA projects that may impact their own objectives. Interviewees suggested three organizational solutions to this problem. First and most critical is maintaining persistent organizational structures such as CMSEs and Special Operations Forces Liaison Elements (SOFLEs). As a former DoS political advisor to Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA) explained, “Having an enduring presence matters. Although they also have short deployments, CMSEs and SOFLEs are better institutionalized and connected to country teams. Since we [civilians] need to triage our engagements, my advice is always to focus on the CMSEs and SOFLEs, which are the best positioned to contribute to whole-of-government efforts and to add up to effective programs over time.”

Second, having CA teams embrace the relay-race nature of their deployments, alongside the metaphorical marathon-runners in the civilian agencies and NGOs, requires a change of mindset that defines success beyond a single deployment. A former CA officer, now working for USAID, suggested: “The short duration is not the key issue, it’s the report card. Teams and their commanders need to realize that moving the ball forward requires ‘tactical patience.’ Iterative progress across multiple deployments is actually okay.”
Third, CA Soldiers and Marines themselves cited a variety of best practices for mitigating handover challenges but conceded that these are not as widely used as they could be. Examples cited include CIM platforms that vary across time, space and chains of command, thus complicating coordination efforts; and difficulties in tracking the chain of custody for CA-funded projects beyond the previous few deployments. In the words of Major Geisinger, “transition, the final step in the CA methodology, becomes especially important... because most programs cannot be planned, approved, funded, executed and completed without at least one turnover in personnel. The short-term nature of military deployments in proportion to State postings causes a high turnover rate among military personnel, making continuity of effort a critical principle.”

Training. Civilian agency representatives credit the CA community with becoming more familiar with Africa operating environments due to improvements in training, which in turn reflects the regional alignment of force structure and repeated deployments to the region. In the words of a retired CA general officer, “USACAPOC [U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Training Command] never trained [Army Reserve CA] teams for Phase Zero engagements [and] across AFRICOM, there was less knowledge of the region... but that is changing. A good analogy might be the U.S. soccer team at the World Cup.” On the active component side of the community, according to one DoS observer, “the maturation of CA has happened due to repeated deployments over time. SOCABRICA tried to do a regional alignment, and Third Group has a formal regional training program on the AFRICOM AOR. However, the Request for Forces does not focus on human skills and context. Soldiers don’t have individual choice [about where they deploy] in the same way that Foreign Service Officers do, although some units... are building an expertise despite the fact.” Ironically, this Africa regional expertise, developed with great care over the past decade, may dissipate quickly if DoD opts to shift manpower and assets away from Africa to address other global threats.

Despite progress on training for the Africa regional context, numerous current and former CA interviewees cited the need for additional training on how to work with civilian agencies themselves. In the words of a former DoS political advisor to an AFRICOM service component command, “It is hard for junior officers at the tactical level to understand the importance of other agencies such as USAID, and NGOs, in aiding the success of the CA team’s mission. Once you reach the level of colonel, that is understood, but the information is not always successfully passed down to first lieutenants and captains.” One factor that seems to make a difference is when civilian agencies are willing and able to send participants to pre-deployment training—and this is happening with increasing frequency. However, neither civilians nor the CA community have sought regularly to sustain these relationships during deployments or after redeployment. As a result, participation in pre-deployment training can seem like a one-off effort without a measurable return on investment for civilian participants.

Materiel. To many civilians, the best-known “materiel” associated with CA teams is the small-project assistance used as a civic-engagement tool to build relationships and gain access to indigenous populations and institutions. Most interviewees acknowledged that this aspect of civil engagement now works fairly well in Africa, supported by DoD policies and processes that favor information-sharing at the country team level. Civilians have come to accept and respect the difference between civil-engagement projects pursued for “visibility,” in support of military objectives, as opposed to those pursued for “viability,” that is, the sustainable development outcomes favored by donor agencies and NGOs.

However, civilians and CA interviewees alike complained about the current structure and timeline for distributing Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) resources,
which fund many civil engagement projects. Managed by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), “OHDACA assistance is meant to improve DoD visibility, access and influence while reinforcing security and stability, to build collaborative relationships with civil society, and to generate positive public relations and goodwill toward DoD.” However, both USAID and CA respondents noted that OHDACA’s “very slow process for not a lot of money,” usually less than $50,000 per project; its lack of flexibility in the face of evolving local conditions; the difficulties in tracking OHDACA requests across multiple deployment cycles; and the challenges of managing expectations with partner-nation officials. One USAID employee stationed in East Africa asked, “Is there a place where we can point out how to facilitate and streamline the [OHDACA project funding request] system? We don’t really have anyone . . . who can advocate for us.” As another USAID Foreign Service Officer, who served at AFRICOM headquarters, explained, “USAID cares about OHDACA because it is one of the few places where their funding authorities directly overlap with ours. They probably recognize that there are problems . . . but it’s difficult to change things in the military.”

Leadership and Personnel. As any CA Soldier or Marine, diplomat or development worker knows, human factors remain decisive to the achievement of outcomes. According to many interviewees serving in the Africa region, the commitment by successive AFRICOM commanders in supporting civilian-led diplomatic and development-oriented engagements has created a fertile environment for collaboration. A CA officer at AFRICOM headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, commented, “General Waldhauser and his predecessors have made the DoD posture clear: the whole perspective of this command is that we are in a supporting role.” Likewise, collaborative relationships have tended to flourish wherever U.S. chiefs-of-mission prioritize and model civilian-military partnership. A USAID Foreign Service Officer explained, “Personalities matter. The ambassador and deputy chief of mission [in a West African country] enforce a ‘one team, one mission’ concept that brings everyone together. We’ve had a lot of goodwill on both sides.”

Leadership and personnel are likewise praised at lower echelons. An NGO representative who works closely with active-duty CA noted: “The quality of CA team leaders has grown. The Army has put emphasis on getting rid of underperformers; CA has become more focused on quality in recent years. The company-commander level provides better mentoring. We started to see this change five or six years ago when CA became more focused on threat mitigation. Now, the 91st [CA Battalion] is entirely Africa focused. They no longer have to try to replicate in Africa what they tried to do in Afghanistan.”

Moreover, civilian agency respondents generally credited CA teams for being intelligent, hard-working and eager to learn. A USAID Foreign Service officer in East Africa remarked: “They bring a lot of enthusiasm. They bring the issue of security and military approach to things in sharp relief: their perspectives are useful to us as we manage our programs. There are a lot of things we don’t necessarily think about because of the way we are trained.” These comments reflect the importance that unified action partners place on the “solution” of a human-geography-informed, mission-command-oriented approach to partnership and influence, as outlined in the Civil Affairs: 2025 and Beyond White Paper—and unified action partners’ appreciation for CA’s skills in this arena.

Facilities. Civilian counterparts likewise appreciate the advantages CA teams can bring in accessing areas judged too dangerous or far-flung for civilians to visit on their own. In Burkina Faso, “The embassy regional security officer created travel restrictions due to concerns about violent extremist activities, so a USAID site visit was cancelled. Instead, we asked a CA team that had access to the region to check in on our project on our behalf, which worked out well:
they verified things and took photos.”

In Somalia, “The tight constraints around diplomatic security are a huge challenge and disadvantage. We generally cannot travel with DoD personnel to [forward operating bases] without specific permission from the DoS undersecretary for management.”

**Policy.** Multiple interviewees cited a lack of overall strategic direction for CA across the Africa region, as well as persistent confusion among some commanders about the role and purpose of CA. However, the new Theater CA Planning Team (TCAPT) at AFRICOM has already begun to overcome this challenge. In late 2017, the TCAPT in Stuttgart developed a strategic vision for the community in Africa and has begun matching resources and force structure to these objectives. The recently completed Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR), which outlines DoS, DoD and USAID roles in stabilization contexts, also offers a valuable policy context in which to frame CA’s unique capabilities.

**Summary of Recommendations Emerging from the CA Experience in Africa**

As Geisinger notes, “To date, the CA community has not embarked on any internal analyses of its own contributions to U.S. diplomatic objectives and special operations objectives over time in a given country or region.” The interviews conducted for this paper provide ample data for such an analysis, should the CA community wish to undertake one. Seven recommendations in particular are worthy of consideration:

1. **Improve CA doctrine.** The AFRICOM TCAPT and its peers in other combatant commands should drive the development of CA doctrine to reflect effective, contemporary CA operations in Title 22 environments. This would involve distilling what commanders and ambassadors actually want from CA, and measuring what actually works, from among the Regiment’s broad range of historical requirements.

2. **Mitigate short deployments.** The TCAPTs and their Regimental partners in the CA proponent and CA commands should compile and mandate best practices for transferring project data and contacts from one CA team to another to overcome the short-deployment dilemma. Likewise, TCAPTs are well-placed to facilitate lessons learned from one country team to another, as well as with their peers in other combatant commands. They can promote better chain-of-custody documentation for CA projects and develop common CIM networks that cross-reference each other.

3. **Partner with civilians on CA training.** Interagency partners must likewise be encouraged to promote the value of collaboration with CA. For example, USAID’s newly-assigned Mission Civil-Military Coordinators fill an important institutional gap within country teams; the program should thus be closely evaluated and refined beyond the current experimental phase. Likewise, both DoS and USAID would benefit from a more holistic approach to engagement before, during and after CA deployments, to reinforce enduring relationships and gather lessons.

4. **Fix OHDACA.** TCAPTs are well-placed to engage with DSCA and other OHDACA stakeholders about potential reforms that could streamline decisionmaking processes and speed up project design, approval, implementation and evaluation.

5. **Posture CA as a leader on regional integration.** The annual Africa Strategic Dialogue and Africa Strategic Integration Conference hosted by AFRICOM provide excellent strategic-level forums for discussion among the three core agencies on trans-border
challenges that require collaboration. In these cases, CA can potentially serve as a sub-regional integrator supporting the bilaterally focused civilian agencies, drawing on lessons learned from the Lake Chad Basin, Central Africa and various CJTF-HOA operations. Doing so would facilitate implementation of the SAR and potentially contribute to conflict and violence prevention across a region that desperately needs such interventions.

6. **Support a new generation of civil-military co-deployments.** DoS and USAID officials are examining whether and how to mainstream some recent experiments in which civilian employees of those agencies have been able to serve under the security umbrella of DoD forces. As the “nearest neighbor” to unified action partners in stabilization contexts, CA should actively encourage and support these efforts.

7. **Build partner-nation CA capabilities.** In the words of a DoS official, “Under the National Defense Authorization Act (2017), Section 333 combines DoD authorities and provides an opportunity for . . . building the equivalent of a CA capability inside partner nation militaries, to help them win hearts and minds in their local populations and counter insurgencies more effectively. AFRICOM would be a great platform for doing that.”50,51 Similarly, a CA Reservist working for DoS noted: “A lot of militaries in the Africa region require better civilian relationships and best practices. CA can teach them these principles and activities. It would also be good training for the CA Regiment itself. Where CA can be most helpful is in setting conditions for peace building and ending conflicts, as well as safely resettling displaced populations.”52 This comment succinctly describes what the consolidation of gains might look like in the AFRICOM AoR, as the CA Regiment conceptualizes its role in 2025 and beyond.

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**Endnotes**


3 Interview with a former DoS political advisor to a service component command supporting AFRICOM.

4 Interview with a non-government organization (NGO) representative working on conflict issues in Africa.

Interview with an active duty CA U.S. Army colonel. The 95th Civil Affairs Brigade was activated on 16 March 2007, https://www.soc.mil/95th/95thhomepage.html.

Interview with an active duty CA officer serving at AFRICOM.

Interviews with four CA reservists.


Based on numerous interviews with DoS and USAID Foreign Service officers deployed to these countries.


Based on numerous interviews with DoS and USAID Foreign Service officers deployed to these countries.

FM 3-57, 18.

FM 3-57, 18.

Geisinger, 38.

FM 3-57, 4-8–4-10.

Geisinger, 43.

In fact, CA reservists typically have a longer deployment period on the continent—nine months, as opposed to six-month deployments for active duty CA forces.

Interview with a former DoS political advisor to a service component command.

Interview with a former CA officer now serving as a USAID civil servant.

Joint interview with a DoS employee and retired Army CA brigadier general.

Geisinger, 48.

USACAPOC (A) is responsible for training U.S. Army Reserve CA units, which comprise 82 percent of CA forces, http://www.usar.army.mil/Commands/Functional/USACAPOC/About-Us/.

Joint interview with a DoS employee and retired Army CA brigadier general.

Interview with a former DoS Political Advisor (POLAD) to a service component command supporting AFRICOM.


Interviews with seven CA Soldiers and Marines across a variety of ranks and echelons.

Interview with a former DoS POLAD to a service component command supporting AFRICOM.

Interview with a Special Operations Support Team liaison to USAID headquarters.

Interview with a U.S. NGO representative working on conflict issues in Africa.


“Soldiers in Sandals,” 105.
Interviews with USAID Foreign Service Officers in East Africa and with three separate CA commissioned and non-commissioned officers previously deployed to the same region.

Interview with a USAID Foreign Service Officer in East Africa

Interview with a (different) USAID Foreign Service Officer in East Africa.

Interview with an active duty CA officer serving at AFRICOM.

Interview with a USAID Foreign Service Officer in West Africa.

Interview with an NGO representative working on security issues in Africa.

Interview with a USAID Foreign Service officer in East Africa.

U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence, *Civil Affairs: 2025 and Beyond White Paper* (Fort Bragg, NC: Civil Affairs Proponent, 5 December 2018), 11.

Interview with a USAID Foreign Service Officer in West Africa.

Interview with a USAID country development (desk) officer.

Interview with three CA officers and a DOS employee.

Interview with an active duty CA officer serving at AFRICOM.


Interview with a DoS civil servant.

Interview with a CA Reservist working as a DoS civil servant.
The consequences of failing to fight and win in the Gray Zone are becoming apparent, resulting in nebulous strategic implications for the United States. Recent research links our inability to challenge adversaries regionally in adversary influence operations directed against the U.S. homeland. Civil Affairs (CA) is a strategic capability with the potential to identify and disrupt adversary aggression regionally, as well as to conduct offensive influence actions to achieve key U.S. strategic objectives. However, the greatest obstacle to this is a cultural bias in favor of kinetic or maneuver warfare.

This organizational bias continues to marginalize Special Operations Forces (SOF) in their prosecution of waging irregular warfare in complex, non-linear systems. This bias has also contributed to an identity crisis within the CA Regiment, and this ongoing identity crisis is currently the greatest barrier to the effective utilization of CA capabilities across the enterprise. Changes to organization and doctrine by themselves are not sufficient. Optimizing CA requires developing alternatives to the current narrative of warfare; it also requires strategies who tell the CA story in a way that resonates with American military culture.

The Importance of Narrative

Dr. Ajit Maan describes narrative as a strategic story, “It is the telling of a story in a certain way for a certain purpose. The way is identification. The purpose is influence.” Narratives are culturally-embedded, meaning-making structures through which we understand and create our identities.” “But it goes much deeper than simple communication of the conscious variety because most of us are unconscious of the narratives that form us—the narratives we live by. So, when you are effectively using narrative you are generally tapping into an unconscious narrative and triggering an unconscious response.” Narrative is largely independent of facts and is rooted deeply in emotion and identity. Narrative strategies are at work in insurgencies and political movements, and in general, attempting to counter a narrative through messaging has little likelihood of success.

This continuing conventional military aversion to irregular warfare illustrates the power and persistence of narrative. Gray Zone and influence operations are frequently discussed at senior leader level and often prioritized accordingly. Yet, in execution, there is a severe disconnect at all levels of war; this disconnect is often tied into the lack of effective narrative strategies. They engage emotions and beliefs and do not necessarily need to be grounded in truths. Effective narratives are proactive, and they offer a sense of belonging. While on an intellectual level the U.S. military understands the importance of irregular warfare, when resourcing or training decisions are made, a clear bias against it appears. The recent RAND analysis of Department of Defense (DoD) stabilization capabilities “indicated a common pattern of forgetting that stabilization is a vital function that must be performed across the range of military operations.” This is surprising considering that stability operations have long been a part of doctrine, are taught through professional military education, and generate a vast amount of research. Dr. Nadia Schadlow refers to this disconnect as “American denial syndrome.”

The Civil Affairs Regiment has made great strides in optimizing its force over the past decade. Changes in doctrine, organization, and training, are occurring at a pace not normally seen
in the Department of Defense. The recent *Civil Affairs: 2025 and Beyond White Paper* sets out a comprehensive vision for CA in the future operating environment. The updated Field Manual 3-57: *Civil Affairs* clarifies roles, competencies and activities. Despite these changes, CA has had difficulty overcoming this cultural bias. Without effective narrative strategies, optimization of the CA force will continue to be elusive.

**The American Way of War Narrative**

Historian Russell Weigley, in his book *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*, argued that as American military and strategic culture developed over time, “[W]e grew addicted to a style of conflict that demanded massive resources, overwhelming force, superior technology, a dash of hubris and decisive, complete victory.”

The current narrative of the American way of war is flawed in that it focuses on firepower, maneuver and lethality, while adversaries, from Russia to China to Iran, focus on irregular warfare. While there are indicators that point to an increased likelihood of large-scale, great power warfare, there is a strong case to be made that effectively waging irregular warfare may prevent great power competition from developing into high-intensity warfare. The 2018 *National Security Strategy* clearly identifies nonconventional threats as being some of the greatest challenges. However, in practice, preparing for conflict often takes precedence over its prevention.

Failing to challenge adversary actions early in low-risk spaces leads to the possibility of escalation in spaces where risk increases. For example, disrupting the beginning of an adversary influence campaign may go unnoticed to all but that adversary, and may only require the deployment of a few low-visibility Special Warfare teams working with civilian agencies. On the other hand, challenging an active ground combat insurgency requires significantly more deployed forces, as well as lethal aid to partner forces, and increases the likelihood of escalation by adversaries.

The barriers to effectively waging irregular warfare are often found in the narrative sphere. There are narrative titles in American military culture that “the military should not be involved in nation-building,” and that aspects of strategic soft power and diplomacy are signs of weakness, while hard power is a sign of strength. This narrative of overwhelming force was not always a part of American history. The founders were proponents of using diplomatic and economic aspects of national power during great power competition in the 1700’s and 1800’s. The Lewis and Clark Expedition could be viewed as a form of “frontier political warfare” supporting diplomatic and economic elements of national power by challenging British and French trade relationships with the Indian tribes of the west.

Even in recent years there have been successes in dealing with complex problems, in places such as Haiti, Kosovo and the Philippines. However, the lessons from these experiences have not been absorbed by the enterprise. The bias appears to be unconscious, embedded deeply in military culture and tied to the identity of the U.S. military, if not of the United States itself.

The current narrative of the American way of war is tied closely to two conflicts that have affected the cultural makeup and identity of the military: World War II and Vietnam. World War II is viewed as a time of great American victory, enshrined in popular and military culture. The Vietnam conflict is widely viewed as a low point in American military history, a divisive war without clear objectives or measures of victory. For over 70 years after the conclusion of World War II, it shaped both the identity of the Army and its leaders. This paradigm of World War II as “the good war” and Vietnam as “the bad war” has had a detrimental effect on our ability to wage war in the Gray Zone.
The Identity Problem

Narrative is ultimately about identity, and the lack of a cohesive identity within the CA Regiment has long been a barrier to developing a narrative. The identity crisis in CA is far from new. The popular view is that it was the result of the “divorce” in 2006 that removed U.S. Army Reserve CA from the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOCOM) and placed them under the jurisdiction of the United States Forces Command. However, anecdotal reports from pre-2006 indicate that a division between the three tribes of CA existed at the time—a division that was just as intense and counterproductive as today’s divisions.

Prior to 2006, all Army CA units were organized under USASOCOM; however, they were still divided into three tribes. The active duty 96th CA Battalion was designated as General Support with an early entry mission supporting both conventional and special operations forces. It consisted mainly of Special Forces noncommissioned officers and Functional Area 39 (Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations) officers. Four Reserve Foreign Internal Defense/Unconventional Warfare (FID/UW) battalions (later renamed as Special Operations battalions) were the designated SOF CA component, with a dedicated mission of working with Special Forces Groups and supporting Theater Special Operations Commands. The FID/UW battalions had unit-based selection and assessment programs, and conducted advanced training on UW. The vast majority of Reserve CA units were designated as General Purpose battalions and aligned with conventional forces, though all three types existed under an SOF command.

Central to the identity issue is the fact that multiple capabilities are housed under the same career field. The attributes and training required to conduct UW differ from the attributes and training required to conduct high-intensity warfare. The single career field, as well as the lack of an active duty CA branch until 2006, demonstrate a lack of interest from the Army, as well as a lack of understanding of these capabilities and how they are related. These shortcomings are rooted in the inability for CA to promote its core capabilities through a strong narrative strategy.

Heritage versus Lineage

The CA Centennial is marked by post-World War I military government activities in occupied parts of Germany. It is necessary when crafting a narrative to make the distinction between heritage and lineage. Military lineage, as determined by military historians and the Institute of Heraldry, is governed by fairly strict rules. For example, the 75th Ranger Regiment’s official lineage is traced to 1943 and the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional). The Rangers’ heritage, however, traces back to Roger’s Rangers during the French and Indian War. Similarly, the Special Forces Regiment’s official lineage is tied to the 1st Special Service Force, yet its heritage includes the Office of Strategic Services, a joint and interagency organization. While both lineage and heritage are important to military units, heritage can provide the basis for a compelling narrative.

The lineage of the CA Regiment begins in 1918, yet its heritage starts much earlier. The Lewis and Clark Expedition is recognized as one of the first CA-type missions undertaken by the U.S. Army. President Jefferson’s instructions to Captain Meriwether Lewis read like a civil reconnaissance checklist: “The fur trade would require knowledge of the Indian tribes.” Jefferson instructed Lewis to learn the names of their nations and their numbers, the extent of their possessions, their relations with other tribes, their languages, traditions, monuments their occupations—whether agriculture, hunting or war—the implements they used for these activities, their food, clothing and housing, the diseases prevalent among them and the remedies
they used, their laws and customs and—last on the list but first in importance—“articles of commerce they may need or furnish & to what extent.” President Jefferson went on to instruct Captain Lewis to arrange for a few chiefs to travel to Washington to meet with him. This is an example of strategic engagement and defense support to diplomacy, similar to the strategic goals of modern CA teams.

The heritage of military government also predates the Hunt Report. General Winfield Scott’s post-conflict stabilization activities in Mexico are widely regarded as the first military government operations conducted by the U.S. Army. They were followed by Indian Affairs operations on the frontier, reconstruction in the South following the Civil War and the Philippine Constabulary. Military government activities are well-known for occupation duties in both World Wars and have found their way into popular culture through *The Monuments Men* and *A Bell for Adano*.

**Waging Organizational Narrative Warfare**

Waging “Narrative Warfare” within organizations differs significantly from waging it against an external adversary. The goal of a CA narrative would not be to supersede the maneuver narrative, or even to dominate the narrative space, but rather to correct an imbalance in national security capabilities and offer a wider range of options to policymakers and the public at large. This imbalance, rooted in identity and narrative, cannot be effectively countered solely with facts and logic. An effective narrative strategy must engage emotions as well as thoughts.

One technique is to offer an alternate narrative. The Lewis and Clark Expedition offers such a narrative that has already resonated with the American public. It does not directly challenge the narrative of World War II; it is a complementary narrative in American military history, but one in which civil reconnaissance and diplomacy were the decisive effort.

Another technique is to align with the opposing narrative. In this sense, military government is historically well-aligned with the World War II victory and the success of The Marshall Plan. The story of military government could be described as inter-narrative, bridging the gap between competing narratives of conventional and irregular warfare.

These vignettes of the “civil scout” on the frontier and the World War II technical experts restoring a war-torn society can be powerful narratives and should be amplified in order to forge an enduring identity. Civil affairs must expand on these vignettes and utilize unifying rituals, symbols, stories and heroes if it expects to compete in non-linear narrative battle-spaces dominated by maneuver warfare proponents.

**Aligning Doctrine and Narratives**

Recent changes to Army Special Operations doctrine with Army Doctrine Publication 3-05 and to CA doctrine with the new version of FM 3-57 offer a pathway to clarifying identity through doctrine. In particular, the separation of core competencies, CA Activities, Military Government Operations and CA Supported Activities, could lead to two separate career fields—CA and military government.

Doctrinally, CA and military government would have a relationship similar to that of Special Warfare and Surgical Strike, as complementary capabilities supporting an overarching theory. This division in terms of doctrine would also allow specialization of capabilities, with CA focusing on the “prevent” and “shape” aspects of conflict and military government focusing on “prevail in large-scale ground operations” and “consolidate gains.”
Conclusion and Recommendations

Narrative strategies do not fit neatly into the DOTMLPF-P model (consisting of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities and policy) that the Army uses for force development. However, there are a few key organizational and training changes that can support and amplify the narrative strategies to optimize CA. First, the current organizational model for CA that divides the force along the lines of “SOF” and “conventional force” runs counter to effective narrative strategies. Identity and emotion are the keys to effective narratives. Currently, identity within the CA Regiment is based on component and command relationship, such as “active duty/reserve,” and “SOF/conventional.” This is a poor basis for creating effective and enduring narratives. Heritage and history form a better foundation on which to build identity and narrative than bureaucratic structure ever can. The dual narratives of the civil scout on the frontier and the World War II civil sector technical experts provide an ideal basis upon which to build organizational models.

A step toward reorganizing the Regiment would be to split the force between CA and military government capabilities and to expand the military government career field. CA units would focus on Civil Reconnaissance, Civil Engagement and Civil Information Management. Military government units would focus on Transitional Military Authority and Support to Civil Administration. This delineation would be consistent with the latest version of FM 3-57. It would also optimize CA toward prevent and shape operations and military government toward consolidating gains, as described in FM 3-0. Clarifying roles and responsibilities and ensuring a proper division of labor would go a long way to supporting narratives and reducing conflict within the Regiment.

A persistent difficulty in conveying CA narratives to the rest of the force is the current difference in structure and capabilities of units labeled as “CA units.” Reconnaissance, engagement and governance functions must occur throughout the entire spectrum of conflict—for this reason, the diverse nature of the CA Regiment is a strength. Having units that can operate in denied areas, as well as units that can support maneuver warfare, make the Regiment ubiquitous in every conflict scenario. However, putting the CA label on all of these diverse units leads to confusion among supported commands as to exactly what capabilities they have at their disposal. Bringing back the historical term of “military government,” and aligning that term with maneuver forces and the concept of high-intensity warfare, reinforces the idea that conflict is non-linear and that there are transitions back and forth throughout the spectrum of conflict. CA units hand off to military government units who then hand back to CA. The change in units serves as a reminder to supported commands of changing conflict environments.

Expanding career fields will also allow for the development of new capabilities to address gaps in DoD support to stabilization identified in the new Stabilization Assistance Review. A recent RAND study on DoD Stabilization Capabilities suggests a need to rebuild, reorganize and improve these capabilities, specifically naming CA, military police and construction engineers as specialties that play critical roles across the stability functions and in both conflict and pre-conflict environments. Dividing the force must go beyond merely renaming units; it should provide a blank slate on which to optimize functions.

Dividing the force should be undertaken with the assumption that CA and military government are interdependent capabilities and that each new type of unit will require a mix of CA and military government personnel, though in different quantities. As an example of what this division could look like, CA units would retain most of their current structure, focused on the CA Team as the primary unit of action, but augmented at headquarters levels with more 38G
Military Government Specialists. Military Government units would be staffed by 38G Military Government Specialists along with a new career field of tactical generalists, perhaps “Military Government Advisors.” These generalists would focus on direct support to maneuver units, augmenting G9 and S9 sections, conducting assessments, and integrating military government activities with other stabilization capabilities such as military police and engineers. CA personnel would also be integrated within military government units, responsible for maintaining the continuity between pre- and post-conflict persistent engagement activities. Under this paradigm, CA could be branded as a persistent engagement force, while military government would be known as an expeditionary stabilization force, with each capability aligning with its historical roots.

Expanding career fields would also address the issue of multiple training pathways, an enduring source of discord within the Regiment. A single training model does not address the multiple capabilities that are needed across the range of military operations. While there is a common thread running through these required capabilities, they require further refinement and specialization development that a single career field cannot provide.

Dividing the reserve force into a smaller number of CA units and a larger military government force, through the creation of a military government tactical generalist career field, would solve many of the CA training issues for the reserve component (RC) and optimize the reserve CA capability to support maneuver forces. Civil reconnaissance and civil engagement require personal attributes that cannot be trained; thus, selection is essential. Training in language, regional studies and survivability is also essential. However, adoption of a year-long active duty course is a challenge for the RC. National Guard Special Forces went through a similar progression from a distance learning training program to the current active duty qualification course. However, RC Special Forces downsized from four groups to two in the early 1990’s. A military government tactical generalist training pathway, focusing on maneuver warfare and stabilization/transition activities, while retaining a distance learning curriculum, would allow the RC to maintain readiness and to provide better support to maneuver forces.

The Naval Postgraduate School Capstone Project, CA 2025: The Strategic Design of Civil Affairs, identifies narrative and branding strategies that resonated with selected target audiences and have great potential for telling the story of CA and military government. Consideration should also be given to the images and symbols that advance narratives. The CA 2025 paper suggested a variety of symbols, from tomahawk branch insignia to a gray beret and redesigned unit patches. Symbols as a branding strategy are powerful in advancing narratives and evoke emotion and meaning. Both CA and military government deserve unique symbols that reflect their rich heritage.

Finally, it should be noted that CA is itself a force of choice for waging warfare in the narrative sphere. By engaging with indigenous populations and gaining a deep understanding of their narratives, CA units are positioned to wage narrative warfare in support of national security objectives and address Gray Zone challenges. However, in order to optimize CA for this role, it is necessary to address the narrow concept of warfare that is prevalent in American culture. CA narrative strategies are not limited to influencing the Army or the Joint Force; they must also shape the national debate over national security strategy. Developing compelling narratives within the Regiment is both a prerequisite and a first step.

American denial syndrome is a cultural phenomenon, tied to identity and narrative. While intellectually, the U.S. national security establishment understands and appreciates irregular warfare and stabilization activities, less conscious biases impede the strategic integration and
operations execution of these efforts. The solution to this problem is found in the idea of narrative warfare. The CA Regiment, by drawing on its heritage, developing narratives that resonate with and support strategic narratives along with organizational changes, can ultimately serve as a leader in rebalancing national security capabilities in a way that is more appropriate for the challenges of the competition continuum that lie ahead.

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Endnotes


4 “Insight: Interview with Ajit Maan, Narrative Strategies.”


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Optimizing Civil Affairs through Reorganizing the Force

by Captain Patrick Casserleigh

The CA Regiment, specifically their largest element in the United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne) [USACAPOC(A)], must work to stay ahead of the curve to meet emerging threats and ever-changing operational environments. The Army has shifted from counterinsurgency to a four-plus-one threat concept while reorganizing their maneuver force and updating their collective training. Constant revisions to the civil affairs (CA) DOTMLPF-P (doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, facilities and policy) must occur for their forces to maintain relevance and value among ground force commanders. This paper makes four recommendations for the CA Regiment to optimize their force. The first is a reorganization of its CA battalions and companies. The second is a reallocation of equipment to meet the challenges of modern warfare. The third is for expansion of Army Reserve CA personnel into active component formations and exercises to maintain a CA presence at the maneuver division and corps level. Finally, this paper recommends an update to CA training to ensure that the CA Regiment meets the requirements of future engagements.

Introduction

USACAPOC(A) provides the majority of the Department of Defense (DoD) forces that execute civil reconnaissance and civil engagement. CA soldiers are also responsible for mapping the physical and human terrain and for shaping political-military environments on behalf of their supported commanders during military operations. Updates to DOTMLPF-P are required for CA forces to provide the capabilities that the Army requires for Unified Land Operations (ULO). The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff calls on the military to be ready to face the threats of four-plus-one or a near-peer fight. The Army needs CA forces to map and leverage changing conditions in the human terrain, build and employ cross cultural networks and conduct integrated security activities during all phases of military operations. The two major questions are:

• What does the CA Regiment stand to gain by updating the USACAPOC (A) CA battalion and company task organization and modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) in the face of the changing Army force structure?

• How can the CA Regiment adjust its focus through DOTMLPF-P to address how the Army will fight and win future wars?

This paper explores the mission for CA battalions and companies according to the latest doctrine. It contrasts the existing challenges surrounding the 2018 MTOE for U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) CA battalions and presents the strength of USACAPOC(A) battalions as of August 2018. It explains how the Army has changed its force structure among the maneuver elements and identifies gaps for the CA proponent to fill in order to meet the contemporary and future needs of the Army. Finally, this paper makes recommendations on how to optimize the CA Regiment by addressing existing gaps concerning the CA DOTMLPF-P. By addressing these identified shortfalls, USACAPOC(A) could fill many of these gaps by increasing their mission readiness, capabilities and value to the supported ground force commanders.
Current Alignment of USAR CA Battalions and Companies

U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-57 Civil Affairs Operations, released in May 2018, states that the role of CA forces is to engage and influence unified action partners and indigenous populations and institutions, conduct military governance operations (MGO), enable civil-military operations (CMO) and provide civil considerations expertise through the planning and execution of CA operations. FM 3-57 states that CA elements execute three core competencies that include civil affairs activities (CAA), MGO and CA-supported activities. FM 3-57 lays out each competency and their separate functions executed by CA elements and provides guidance in reference to the rule of allocation of CA forces. Doctrine now calls for CA battalions to directly support maneuver divisions and for CA companies to support brigade combat teams (BCTs). Their respective commanders can fill G-9/S-9 CA roles while their civil-military operations centers (CMOCs) and subordinate teams conduct their core competencies in support of the maneuver commanders’ desired end state.

Staffing Challenges

There are approximately 12,500 Soldiers assigned to USACAPOC(A). The command is home to 80 percent of the CA forces who fall under the reserve umbrella in the Army. Nearly 8,000 CA Soldiers work within the CA battalions assigned to one of the four Civil Affair Commands and aligned with one or more Geographic Combatant Commands. Across USACAPOC(A), at least 200 CA personnel are in ten countries, supporting real world missions, and another 90 are in five other countries, supporting overseas development training.

The 2018 MTOE for a USAR CA battalion authorizes 203 Soldiers. USAR CA battalions are task-organized with four, 32-Soldier CA line companies and a Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC). Each CA line company consists of a headquarters section, a CMOC and five civil affair teams (CATs). The remaining 75 Soldiers belong to the HHC. Inside the HHC are 29 Soldiers with the military occupational specialty (MOS) code of 38A or 38B. They make up the battalion command section, operations section, civil information management cell, civil affairs planning team (CAPT), civil liaison team and the functional specialty team.

At this time, few USAR CA battalions are fully-manned. To make matters worse, the average duty MOS-qualified (DMOSQ) personnel rating is well below USARC aim points. These factors contribute to an overall degraded available force for the Army to leverage. In other words, there is a shortage of thousands of qualified personnel in the CA battalions across USACAPOC(A). The capabilities gaps include education needs and lag time for USAR, considering DMOSQ and Professional Military Education (PME).

These shortages are largely due to a handful of factors. The first is a bottleneck in the Civil Affairs Qualification Course (CAQC). The second is the length of time required for PME. The third is a limit to the number of days available to execute training on a full-time status based on USAR appropriations. The most critical issue facing USAR Soldiers is time management and balance between their civilian careers and military service. Many of the professionals recruited into the ranks of CA in the USAR hold important positions in their full-time careers. A majority also have families. These factors, paired with time requirements to become DMOSQ in a 38A or 38B billet and the structure of the force leads to a lag between staffing levels and the available force pool.

CA remains a non-accession branch, requiring a 29-day reclassification school for 38Bs and a multi-phase training pipeline for officers that consists of a 26-week online phase followed
by a 29-day residence phase. Prior to attending, the CAQC officers must have completed a Captain Career Course (CCC). Qualified USAR CA officers are the bottleneck for most USAR CA units reaching DMOSQ goals. Recent efforts to streamline the CCC for junior officers transitioning into CA prior to completing their branch career course include a self-paced and self-enrolled distance-learning phase, followed by a 29-day residence phase at Fort Bragg, NC. For officers who have already completed CCC, the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center & School (USAJFKSWC) conducts three classes each fiscal year, generating a maximum of 192 fully-trained company grade officers.

NCOs and other enlisted personnel must attend a 28-day MOS re-class school to become DMOSQ. NCOs face a gap with regard to their Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development System, which requires them to complete their required 40-hour Distributed Leader Course. Then the Soldiers must pass a promotion board and make the Permanent Promotion Recommended List prior to attending the residence phase that is based on their rank or grade. To become fully-qualified, NCOs must then attend the required additional skill identifier associated with the paragraph and line number associated with their duty position (if applicable). This course of events for officers and NCOs alike can take years to accomplish due to the limited time the USAR Soldier can give the Army.

In summary, under the current model, the road to becoming a qualified CA Soldier is a circuitous route for both commissioned officers and NCOs.

**Equipping Challenges**

According to *Civil Affairs: 2025 and Beyond White Paper*, future CA forces will conduct regional missions and expeditionary operations in multiple domains to deter conflict and operate in areas across the spectrum of operations to develop situational understanding and consolidate gains. USAR CA battalions face additional obstacles in the current MTOE. CA companies and their CATs are not fully-equipped to conduct tactical operations due to a lack of night vision, tactical communications and satellite communications equipment. While supporting maneuver units, CATs must be able to operate during hours of limited visibility while conducting ULO against a near-peer threat. According to multiple after-action reviews from the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), equipment shortages and/or failures to plan led to degraded capabilities during multiple CTC rotations.

The 2018 CA company MTOE authorizes only two pairs of night vision goggles per CAT. Each CAT operates out of a single tactical vehicle and available trailer. The 2018 equipment authorization provides night vision capability to the team’s driver and gunner, but not the vehicle commander (usually the team chief). Based on crew qualifications and engagement drills, the vehicle commander must be able to provide the gunner and driver commands to move the vehicle and engage targets while reporting contact to their high headquarters. Cross-leveling inside the battalion normally fills this equipment gap for exercises, but during full-scale operations each element would only have its authorized equipment.

Communications has been an area of persistent shortfall for CATs. While vehicles can be equipped with line-of-site and over-the-horizon communication equipment, tactical or dismounted communication systems are limited to two hand-held radios per CAT. This significantly degrades communication capabilities while the teams conduct operations dismounted or away from their vehicle, which is quite often. During combat operations, teams need to maintain secured tactical communications both internally and with their higher headquarters in order to be effective and maintain security.
The loss of the Satellite Deployable Node-Lite (SDN-L) creates the need for the CA companies and battalions to “plug into” their supported element in order to provide their supported commander with the Civil Common Operation Picture. Arguably, the largest gap is a CA elements inability to send and receive digital information without linking into their supported higher headquarters network. This limits the ability to send critical civil information in the form of situational reports, operational summaries, hasty and deliberate assessments and contact reports to CMOCs while conducting expeditionary operations.

A replacement for the SDN-L is underway in the form of Transportable Tactical Command Communications (T2C2). The TC2C system brings similar capabilities as the SDN-L but fielding has yet to start in USAR CA, which supports among the most intense operations tempo in USAR; but fielding still may be years away. In fact, efforts are underway to exercise a T2C2 at a Joint Warfighter Assessment in Fiscal Year 2019. This leaves the requirement to “plug in” to the supported element’s network, which often creates a burden on the supported element’s S-6/G-6, and affects both mission command and control effectiveness.

**Changes in Force Structure, Threats and Training**

Starting in 2012, the Army began a Force Reduction and Force Shaping program. The results of the program provided each BCT an additional maneuver battalion. These measures provided the BCT with three maneuver battalions, a cavalry squadron, brigade fires, engineers and a support battalion. Each Division lost a BCT, but their remaining BCTs gained a maneuver battalion. Currently, the Division Headquarters Redesign update published by the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC) in February 2018 is underway and due to take effect in FY22. The draft plan calls for Division Engagement Section to lose their active duty conventional CA personnel (formerly under the 85th CA Brigade) and tasks USAR forces to provide those capabilities for full-spectrum operations.

Notably in the same time span, DoD has shifted away from counterinsurgency (COIN) to a near-peer threat with some exceptions across Special Operation Forces and intelligence units. The “four plus one framework” guides the prioritization of countries and groups to include Russia, China, North Korea, Iran and transnational violent extremists. Based on the aforementioned dynamics regarding emerging threats, the Army published the Decisive Action Training Environment versions 2.2 in April 2015 and 3.0 in July 2017. Both documents provide Army maneuver elements and their enablers with a realistic training experience that replicates threats they could face in future operational environments. The CTCs previously focused on preparing Soldiers and units to conduct COIN in Iraq and Afghanistan out of forward operating bases (FOBs). Since the shift, the CTCs utilize the new scenarios (or other expeditionary near-peer scenarios) for their rotations. The changes in what the Army expects to evaluate at CTC rotations has created a sense of urgency for conventional forces to get back to their roots of being capable of engaging a near-peer threat in an expeditionary environment while conducting ULO. Changes include tearing down the FOBs and forcing elements to stay on the move while conducting maneuver operations in austere environments.

Efforts are underway for headquarters to remain mobile and to decrease their signature from enemy detection while conducting ULO. Army units must be able to “jump” their tactical operations centers (TOC) at a moment’s notice under less than desirable conditions. Even corps and division headquarters are improving their ability to remain mobile. They are now utilizing mobile expandable trailers in combination with air beam tents that facilitate “jumping TOC” in hours while operations continue to run from their tactical command post or support
area command post. Forward-deployed CA elements will have to improve their ability to shoot, move, communicate and survive while supporting conventional maneuver elements conducting ULO.

**Recommendations**

In order to address the above-explained shortfalls, USACAPOC(A) should consider implementing the following five recommendations that would lead to enhanced readiness, increased capabilities and a modernized force.

1. Deactivate one CA Company per battalion and one CAT per company. Then increase a CAT from four to five personnel with a minimum of one CLS-qualified Soldier—or more ideally a qualified combat medic—on each team.

2. Adjust the MTOE for the CA Battalion and its companies with regards to night vision, tactical communications and satellite communication equipment, as discussed above.

3. Engage the Department of the Army with regard to filling the gaps in active division G9 staffs, utilizing Soldiers on Active Duty Operational Support Reserve Component (ADOS) tours and/or with Active, Guard and Reserve (AGR) Soldiers.

4. Increase CA brigade and battalion integration with active component commands during WFXs and maintain CA company rotation at JRTC and National Training Centers (NTC). Decrease the reliance on USAR Company Post Exercise Functional (CPX-F) events to fulfill readiness requirements.

5. Continue efforts to streamline the process for the DMOSQ and PME pipeline for CA soldiers and bridge the gap between officer and NCO training programs of instruction (POIs).

The first recommendation would arguably make the largest impact on the CA Regiment. This organizational restructuring would result in maintaining a CA company as a 32-Soldier element but would decrease a CA battalion to 171 personnel. This update to the force structure would generate a leaner force with the capabilities required by the supported commander based on the Army’s restructuring of maneuver elements. These modifications would trigger an automatic increase in the overall readiness of the Command. If implemented, USAR CA battalion metrics would drastically improve, as the average USAR CA battalion strength would increase from 92 percent to a 109 percent. Their DMOSQ rating would increase from 84 percent to 93 percent at the CA battalion level. The restructuring would provide a CAT more combat power during operations by rounding out the crew from four to five. The addition of a 68W (combat medic) would increase a CAT’s survivability and provide further capabilities to the supported unit. Further second and third order effects include but are not limited to: a decrease in demand placed on DMOSQ-producing schools; the ability for senior NCOs and officers to conduct broadened assignments; and the Army’s greater ability to refocus resources to advanced training.

The second recommendation is necessary to ensure that every member of a CAT remains combat effective during day and night operations while conducting mounted and dismounted operations. The cost of implementing this recommendation would be limited by cross-leveling existing equipment after reorganizing the force as recommended. The results would include each member of a CAT or other tactical element being authorized personal night vision and tactical hand-held communication capabilities. In order to improve reporting capabilities across the formation USACAPOC(A) should also work to expedite the fielding of the T2C2 communications system to its battalions.
The third recommendation is for the USAR Command to engage the Department of the Army with respect to the Division Headquarters Redesign update. The proposal states that Division engagement sections (G9) are losing their active duty CA personnel, to include an O-5, O-4 and E-7. This is creating gaps that USACAPOC (A) elements will have to fill when large-scale mobilizations occur, such as in the case of a near-peer conflict or other decisive operations. However, these personnel are required for full-range operations, especially for planning and human geography analysis. USACAPOC (A) could begin to fill those positions with Active Duty Operational Support Reserve Component (ADOS) and/or Active, Guard and Reserve (AGR) positions. These opportunities could provide additional broadening and key development assignments for post command O5’s, O4’s and senior NCOs. Additionally, these G9 assignments could deliver a critical bridge between active and reserve members of the same tactical fighting team during large-scale mobilizations or exercises. Furthermore, USACAPOC(A) would benefit from more of their senior leaders gaining exposure to active commands.

The fourth recommendation is that USACAPOC(A) should continue its support of JRTC and NTC and expand its presence at corps and division WFX. Additional CA BDEs and battalions need to support these commanders during WFXs. These large-scale digital exercises not only allow CA forces to maintain their ability to integrate systems with their AD counterparts, but they also teach staff members how to “speak the language of maneuver” over CPOF and Distributed Common Ground System-Army. USACAPOC(A) should decrease the utilization of the CPX-F for CA BDEs and BNs, as the training value of interacting with a role-player filling in for Division staff is far from ideal. Additionally, WFXs lead to real world relationships with AD counterparts. These provide an exchange of ideas and training through the force, another factor lost with USAR exercises. Overall, CTCs are critical for the CA Regiment to maintain a persistent engagement with their support maneuver elements during exercises replicating ULO.

Finally, some administrative roadblocks need adjusting to streamline the process for the force to catch up on DMOSQ. The procedure for enlisted Soldiers to conduct reclassification training can be long and arduous for administrative staff, requiring a number of memoranda for record signed by the Soldier, commander and school for enrollment of E-7s. E-8s require an administrative grade reduction to attend the school, which limits proven talent from entering the force. Considering the DMOSQ deficit, implementing policies to expedite rather than impede enrollment would improve the process. As NCOs comprise approximately 75 percent of the formation, the CA Regiment must ensure that their training contains the latest doctrine. Incorporating lessons learned from CTC rotations, real world deployments and new doctrine would improve the capabilities of the formation. Updating the POI at the 38B reclassification school and in the PME would enhance the flow of knowledge from the training institutions into the overall force as NCOs frequently attend training.

Summary

The CA Regiment’s largest component must optimize its organization as the Army continues to modify America’s land forces to meet emerging threats and ever-changing operational environments. Constant revisions to the CA DOTMLPF-P must occur for CA elements to maintain relevance and value-added among supported commanders. Reorganization of USA-CAPOC(A)’s staple maneuver support formations, updated training, reallocation of equipment and expansion of CA into active duty commands, formations and exercises are needed to ensure that the CA Regiment can secure the victory in the future.
Captain Patrick Casserleigh serves as a Plans Officer with the 412th CA Battalion (A) located in Columbus, OH. Prior to joining the USAR AGR program, Captain Casserleigh served with B Company, 82nd CA Battalion at Fort Stewart, GA, and deployed the first CAT (Team 8222) to Garoua Cameroon in 2016. Before attending the USA-JFKSWC Civil Affairs Qualification Course, he served as a Troop Executive Officer with the 81st Armor Battalion and as a Scout Platoon leader with 1-9 Cavalry. He has also served as an NCO in the USAF-R (919th Special Operations Wing) and in the Florida Army National Guard (A Company 3/124th Infantry). He holds an MA in Public Administration and a BS from Florida State University; he also has a Black Belt in Lean Six Sigma from the Georgia Institute of Technology.

Endnotes
3 FM 3-57, 3-90.
4 FM 3-57, 3-90.
6 USACAPOC(A) Staff Update Brief.
7 USACAPOC(A) Staff Update Brief.
8 USACAPOC(A) Staff Update Brief.
10 The 412th CA BN(A) supported 5 CTC rotations to include JRTC 18.6, 18.8, 18.9, 18.10 and WFX 18.4.
13 Ibid.
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17 Elizabeth A. Brunette, “News from the CTC.”

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21 Amy Walker, “Army network stays connected.”

22 Amy Walker, “Army network stays connected.”
Civil Affairs 38G Functional Specialists: From Strategy to Reality
by Major Gincarlo Newsome and Captain Jesse Elmore

Many military professionals recognize that while strategy is easy, execution is hard. This certainly has been true for the continuing dilemma of how to employ 38G Civil Affairs (CA) functional experts to fight in a given battle space. There is little debate that today’s military force must employ weapon systems that not only restore the physical security of a populace, but also help to reconstruct and restore a region’s commerce, legal system, transportation, education, logistics, information technology (IT) and other human geography infrastructure security. Helping restore a community to their pre-conflict level of security and stability is a task far more complex than solely maintaining physical security. Lieutenant General Kenneth E. Tovo, in his opening letter to the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) Strategy 2035, states that tomorrow’s adversaries will “more often challenge the stability of a region through indirect means.” In relatively short order and for impressively little cost, 38G CA functional experts partnered with their 38A/B CA generalist comrades are the solution that will allow conventional Soldiers to identify and counter many of these indirect threats.

The distance to take 38G CA functional experts from a sensible strategy to a practical reality has never been shorter. The rapidly-expanding Open API (Open Application Programming Interface)—a cloud-based mobile computing app development ecosystem with a crowd-sourced design—makes this possible. However, effectively implementing this type of app technology requires validating the 38G strategy, having dedicated weapon system program management and funding (similar to U.S. Army Aviation) and implementing a COTS (commercial off-the-shelf) problem-solving approach.

The first step to closing the 38G strategy to reality distance is for Army leadership to not give up on the 38G strategy. Army leadership must remain resolute in figuring out how to have and employ the world’s greatest 38G CA functional experts.

Nature abhors a vacuum. Enemies such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) too often fight and beat American forces by being the first to fill social and economic vacuums. The threat of such unconventional, irregular and indirect means of warfare increasingly face the U.S. conventional force today. This is the type of warfare, however, that 38G CA functional experts are most capable to help fight. Therefore, it is imperative for Army leadership to not give up their resolve to have and employ 38G human weapon systems.

In order to emphasize the value of the 38G strategy, it is worth reviewing a few scenarios in which 38Gs could have been uniquely employed to prevent or more quickly win battles—and with drastically less cost than conventional forces. In the first scenario, U.S. and coalition forces restored physical security to Mosul, Iraq, multiple times. One can argue that had coalition forces and the Iraqi government done more work to help restore indigenous job creation, business reconstruction, entrepreneurship, economic development, counter corruption legal work, trade and education infrastructure restoration, etc. (following the model similar to the Marshall Plan), that ISIS would have had a harder time capturing the social, economic and emotional ground that they seized before they captured physical ground in Mosul and across Iraq.

Many of the centers of gravity in the unconventional battlespace will not be identified and destroyed with advanced hardware but with advanced and shrewd functional expertise. Joint
Publication 5-0 Joint Planning, updated 16 June 2017, emphasizes the need for commanders to have a comprehensive and holistic understanding of the operational environment (OE). The described political, military, economic, social, infrastructure and information variables in the operational environment require top professionals, not amateurs, to effectively assess the threats and opportunities to start shaping the future OE end state.

Senior leaders who properly employ 38G weapon systems can greatly improve their effectiveness in arguably all phases of military operations, saving significant military effort, cost and lives. The solutions presented herein support vertically the tactical to strategic levels of operations and horizontally all phases of operations. 38Gs are a legitimate strategic weapon system that, if assembled in a COTS tool, can be deployed quickly into the operational battlespace and immediately employed by tactical CA teams via a basic mobile computing app. The Army’s 38G weapon systems, delivered by COTS means, can comprehensively engage the civil capacity threats through the pre and post-kinetic phases of war. Consider also how social and economic “ground” threats and non-military indirect threats are more easily recognizable by 38G CA functional experts.

The teaming power of one of these experts working alongside a friendly indigenous counterpart and the 38 A/B CA “generalist” who has brought the professionals together to address a given non-military threat is powerfully effective grassroots Nation Assistance (one of the five CA core tasks). The 38 A/B civil affairs generalist keeps these experts aligned to support the combatant commanders end mission and lines of effort. The 38G CA functional expert force, in cooperation with local indigenous expert counterparts, guides 38 A/B CA generalists and supported combatant commanders to win the asymmetric fight. The 38G CA functional expert force can be key in winning the “indirect” fight and preventing the costlier conventional fight and the associated massive reconstruction costs. 38Gs help to expose the humanitarian costs and crises, pre or post-war, that extend far beyond the traditional myopic military view of a humanitarian crisis that consists solely of food, water, shelter and physical security needs.

Destroyed commerce infrastructure, for example, does not seem like a humanitarian crisis that would require the more commonly recognized CA core task of providing Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. When a person’s entire business, like Rafeh Ghanem’s auto parts business in Mosul, has been “reduced to rubble” by combat operations, the destruction of commerce infrastructure is certainly a humanitarian crisis—a man-made one. Of course, the first issues to resolve are food, water, shelter and physical security. However, if restoring a people’s basic livelihood infrastructure is not also given timely attention, adversaries will fill the gap, no matter how complex that process might be.

Consider how a typical Soldier may be trusted by a populace to distribute food, water, shelter and physical security but will likely (and understandably) not be trusted to assist in restoring such things as sewage capabilities, commerce, the electrical grid, IT, political, legal and education systems and public transportation to full functionality. Soldiers with access to 38G CA functional experts, however, can begin to legitimately address these issues. A Soldier with access to a 38G can partner with an indigenous leader to be extremely lethal in “finding, fixing, finishing and following through,” neutralizing a serious non-military threat.

Such a Soldier could credibly assist a community’s commerce crisis by helping restore key business infrastructures such as internet services, micro banking, business reconstruction or entrepreneurship loans, local business law and even indigenous venture capital development. Furthermore, 38Gs can provide expert continuity of local geographic strategy as 38A/Bs rotate in and out of country. While handing out water, food and shelter is essential, coming alongside
individuals and communities to help rebuild their livelihoods for the long term is a proven path toward lasting and positive Nation Assistance, as we have seen with some past enemies, notably Germany and Japan.

It cannot be emphasized enough how powerful good credibility can be to undermine adversaries. The strongest strategic value Army leadership can expect from their 38Gs is how these weapon systems secure and maintain U.S. credibility as a force for long-term good. In 2015, General Petreaus, who had previously led the U.S. surge of forces that expelled Al Qaeda from Iraq, explained that if the U.S. and coalition forces are to be successful, they must be “legitimate in the eyes of the people and supported by the locals.” U.S. forces’ effectiveness and credibility is critical when facilitating indigenous commerce or entrepreneurial solutions for a region’s reconstruction. The 38G CA functional expert is the credible triage “doctor” for helping restore these essential livelihood services with indigenous partners. Intellectually, although military leadership understands how indigenous expert partnerships are critical, practically speaking it has failed to effectively build and maintain these partnerships. Employing the expertise of 38Gs solves these problems.

These experts are all reservists; as top civilian professionals in their field, have their professional credibility at stake for successful (or failed) counsel with a foreign counterpart. Many generalist 38 A/B CA Soldiers and their infantry counterparts have shared their frustrations in being a part of grossly failed reconstruction projects even though they had no professional civilian expertise. In 2014, Brigadier General Glenn Goddard, writing for The Institute for Stabilization and Transition in a guest essay entitled “Getting the Functional Expert to the Battle-field” described the “Handle It Captain” Army mindset that delivers short-term perceived project success at the expense of U.S. forces’ long-term credibility. CA struggles for credibility and relevance among its other Army branch peers, as it is too often cleaning up the failed projects of previously deployed units. 38Gs are the missing weapons that 38 A/Bs and CA as a branch need to credibly support the ground commander’s lines of effort and operation. The strategy for having and effectively employing 38G CA functional expertise unequivocally strengthens the legitimacy and credibility of the entire Army—externally and internally—and in the short term and the long term.

The second step to closing the distance of effectively employing 38Gs is to resolve practical problems non-bureaucratically with a COTS mindset and approach.

While this paper is not a comprehensive gap analysis, three of the largest gaps in making the 38G program strategy a practical reality include the need for COTS 38G weapon system employment strategy, reach-back and program management. This first practical challenge is figuring out how to train and qualify line Soldiers on how to effectively employ 500 different 38G weapon systems. Each 38G is a unique weapon system with an individual set of capabilities and employment instructions. Army leaders know well the difficulty of simply qualifying all their Soldiers with just the M4 weapon system. Even if one views the 38G team as simply 18 weapon system groups according to the 18 recently updated functional specialty skill identifier categories (Figure 1), there is no official or unofficial training or qualification program for line Soldiers to employ these weapon systems.

Second, even if Soldiers could be trained and qualified in the employment of these weapon systems, getting reach back access to the right 38G weapon systems is extremely difficult. Furthermore, even if a Soldier could get this reach-back access, there is no visibility to the 38Gs schedule of availability to assist. Finally, there is no central leadership or program management for 38G weapon system development. Army Aviation, with their central PEO...
(Program Executive Office) Aviation Office and a Program Management office for each of their aircraft platforms is a model that the CA branch can follow. If Congress and the Army can fund CA, enabling a program management function that mirrors Army Aviation, the Army will finally be able to employ and realize the 38G weapon system “lethality” that the 38G strategy promises.

The AH-64 Apache helicopter was not developed and is not managed today as a solution for a threat as a “Handle it Captain” project. The Apache helicopter’s continued development is performed by a broad group of seasoned experts who know well and continuously study the evolution of the enemy threat. Today, CA 38A/B Soldiers try to help combatant commanders take out threats with their hand-made, partially-laminated, “Smart Books” that they likely began assembling at their CA qualification course. Well-trained Army aviators, on the other hand, help combatant commanders take out threats with $40M Apache helicopters with well-tested systems that are directly and intentionally integrated with the line Soldiers and combatant commands they are supporting. CA would struggle less to prove its relevance and place in tomorrow’s battlespace if they, like Army aviation, also had an army of private expert enterprises and respective congressional representation constantly competing to improve the lethality, survivability and relevance of the CA branch.

If 38Gs were intentionally developed and managed as Army aviation weapon systems, they could also become the world’s most lethal weapon system in their class and likely have a higher ROIL—return on investment lethality. ROIL represents the cost of development, production and deployment of a weapon system and its long term collateral costs, to achieve not only elimination of threats but also completion of end goals. The comparative second, third and fourth order effects and costs of a hellfire missile used in disarming a combatant versus employing a 38G weapon system earlier in the battle is significant. This comparison is not suggesting that 38Gs can or should replace the role of Apache helicopters. The effective employment of 38Gs does, though, help distribute and fund better utilization and development of the Army’s advanced hardware weapon systems. When the majority of the countries of the world have a GDP less than the United States Defense Department budget, the United States should easily have not only the world’s top war fighting hardware but also the world’s top indirect war fighting expertise.

The third and final step to closing the 38G strategy-to-reality distance is to leverage today’s COTS to open API mobile computing app technology, with a crowd-sourcing design, to connect 38A/Bs with 38Gs at anytime and anywhere.
What is a COTS view and why is it especially appropriate for the 38G weapon system? It is a problem-solving mindset or canvas that is largely free of typical military restrictions. For example, CA and 38G CA functional experts conduct Civil Information Management, often in collaboration with external and public non-military organizations. 38G data, information, strategy and actions are largely for public consumption and collaboration. 38Gs are public weapon systems that do not require the same level of firewall protections as that of a conventional military force. 38Gs in themselves are COTS. With this view and application, 38Gs have the unique ability to leverage the latest in COTS technology to aid their employment and effectiveness. Insurgents and many other adversaries develop and fight with encrypted mobile COTS tools. The banking and medical industry has developed ample COTS technologies with the encryption and privacy protections that a 38G and 38A team need. The U.S. Army needs to empower their own Soldiers to leverage the same technologies.

While most people have smart phones and a variety of apps to aid our day-to-day lives, few realize the revolution and explosion of opportunity that is occurring within today’s “Open API” mobile computing environment. In just nine years, over 5,000,000 apps have been created. The first IT defense contractor who gives up their old school desires for a design and interface control monopoly (usually arguing for and hiding behind “military data security” risks) can empower the same explosion of benefits to line Soldiers.

An app similar to Airbnb could be easily and cost-effectively built for line CA Soldiers to find the 38G expertise they need to “find, fix, finish and follow through” with removing an indirect or asymmetric threat to a ground commander’s mission. A crowd-sourced design for the app would allow 38Gs to submit and maintain their own “host” profiles. A 38G could provide downloadable guides to 38A/Bs so that they could best know how to leverage their functional expertise, as an AirBnB host provides home & region guides to prospective guests. 38Gs could

![COTS App Concept](image-url)
publish and maintain their own Field Manuals for how best to employ their expertise and their general functional specialty. As best practices are learned, the app could be programmed to make recommendations to users for gaps in their profile, maintaining currency of information, etc. Soldiers and prospective 38G “guests” anywhere in the world could have immediate access to any 38G to ask basic questions. After a Soldier was assisted or “hosted” by a 38G, they could even post reviews for future guests to best enjoy their “visit” or use of the 38G. 38Gs as reservists could be empowered to list their funded and unfunded availability that 38 A/B could “reserve.” Also, just as AirBnB has a “stupid simple” mechanism to collect payment, make payment and authorize a guest access to a host’s home, ideally such a “MyCA” app should function as easily for a 38A/B to obtain and fund a 38G’s formal assistance. The access, approval, scheduling and funding process for a 38 A/B CA Soldier to get a 38G or multiple 38Gs, assigned to support their mission should be visually clear.

Start-ups all over the country and world work on similar crowd-sourced solutions to less traumatic endeavors than war. Compared to an Army Aviation aircraft program, it would not be difficult or costly for a small and dedicated team to design, develop, field and maintain such a crowd-sourced app that, in effect, would provide asymmetric computing for conducting asymmetric warfare. It would eliminate the Army’s lengthy traditional and hierarchal weapon system delivery approval process and give company level Soldiers instantaneous access to an arsenal of powerful 38G weapon systems. The power of the individual 38G weapon system is also often understated. A 38G represents the “tip of the iceberg” or a fraction of their real power, when one considers the professional network that they represent and have access to. Furthermore, unlike other purely civilian experts and academic resources, a 38Gs prior military experience helps to ensure that CA’s expertise is executed to align and support military strategy.

This app would give line Soldiers an almost flat Army organizational structure, empowering them to quickly counter the “cell” flat organizational structure with which many adversaries have prevailed in the past. The 38G strategy, if made into a practical reality with such an app, would also evolve the failed shotgun “money as a weapon system” strategy to a more precise and reliable strategy of “expertise as a weapon system.” Borrowing an analogy from former Assistant Secretary of State Robert B. Charles, 38Gs with such an app could give the Army a weapon system with the ability to “look around corners” to see and defeat tomorrow’s threat: “Just as we cannot win the next war by fighting the last one, we cannot win the next peace by assuming [that] post-conflict stabilization in the future will take care of itself; on the contrary, smart civil affairs leaders will look around corners and recognize that the future is, in effect, now.” 38G CA functional experts can illuminate those “around the corner” and so provide second, third and fourth order effects of military action.

In conclusion, 38Gs are a great idea, but they need better application in four key ways. First, their strategic value needs to be visible, protected and treated as the critical weapon systems that they are. 38Gs are arguably one of the greatest tools that the U.S. Army has to prevent wars from starting or re-starting, as they can win the “indirect” battles of war. Second, the practical challenges of accessing, leveraging and employing 38G talent is easily resolved when the practical problems are clearly identified and resolved with a non-military COTS mindset. Third, the use of contemporary mobile computing apps, with a crowd-sourced design, could bring an affordable, current and almost overnight arsenal of 38G weapon systems to every field commander on the globe. Fourth, dedicated 38G support leadership, staff and funds, similar to U.S. Army Aviation, need to be established to develop and maintain each of the 18 functional specialty areas as well as the apps and tools that maximize 38G weapon system lethality.
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Captain Jesse John Elmore is a 38A with A Company, 457th CA Battalion, in Vicenza, Italy, with previous CA deployments in Afghanistan as a specialty cell deputy for Regional Command-South and as a CA Team Chief in Iraq. An Assistant Regional Security Officer with the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, since January 2011, he is currently in training for an assignment to U.S. Embassy Tunis, Tunisia. Previous posts have included two years at the U.S. Consulate General Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, as well as temporary duty in Islamabad, Manila, Libya, Georgia, Albania, Ankara, Istanbul, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Tunisia, South Korea and Cambodia. Elmore is a graduate of the University of California, Los Angeles, where he majored in Arabic.

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Endnotes

3 FM 3-57, 3-6.
7 Department of the Army, Pamphlet 611-21: Military Occupational Class and Structure, 5 October 2017, Table 4-3.


Assistant Secretary of State Robert B. Charles, interview with the authors.
Developing Civil Affairs: Increasing Soldier Flexibility and Doctrinal Specificity
by Major Mazi Markel and Sergeant First Class Max Steiner

Over the past 100 years, Civil Affairs (CA) Soldiers have operated in complex and dynamic environments while attempting to support diverse political and military objectives from the tactical to the strategic layer. In this context, it is all too rare to find the “perfect situation” that fits the “perfect solution” for which the Army designs its training. Conflicts will only become more complex over the coming century, as rapid urbanization, socio-political instability and the rise of non-state actors drive future U.S. interventions. The CA mission needs Soldiers who are trained and intellectually prepared to adapt quickly and resiliently to change—to identify and implement an attainable solution quickly in a complicated situation. Adaptability is key to the CA mission. With this in mind, a review of CA doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities and policy (DOTMLPF-P) gives CA professionals an opportunity to enact changes at the force management level in order to meet the newly-delineated expectations identified in the recent publication of the new CA Field Manual (FM) 3-57 and the Civil Affairs: 2025 and Beyond White Paper.

We recommend substantive changes to CA training and doctrine as follows:

- **Training reforms:**
  - Use the existing Department of State (DoS) internship program to place CA Soldiers within U.S. Embassies as routine broadening assignments
  - Include case studies in all levels of CA training.

- **Doctrine reforms:**
  - Increase doctrinal clarity by removing Support to Civil Authority (SCA) and National Assistance (NA) as CA Core tasks and introducing the following CA core tasks: Security Assistance, Governance Assistance and Direct Military Government.

Whether implemented in whole or piecemeal, these changes would help develop more rounded Soldiers who could better integrate CA capabilities into their supported units and interagency partners in the inevitably complex engagements of the future.

**Training Reform: Internships**

CA should prepare to operate in complex multi-agency environments. In modern conflicts, the Army will not be operating in a vacuum, and yet CA has not taken advantage of the United State’s well-developed foreign affairs and global development infrastructure to better prepare Soldiers for working with Unified Action Partners across the full range of operations. The DoS emphasized the developmental advantages for diplomats and civil servants of short overseas work in the 2015 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. In the same vein, CA Soldiers, whether active or reserve, would be well-served by short assignments to the DoS, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) or other civilian agencies, as well as leverage the existing DoS infrastructure for college internships to provide a high-impact opportunity for the CA force. The skills and professional connections made during short internship...
assignments overseas would benefit Soldier and unit readiness and serve as a non-monetary performance incentive that would help CA retain its best and brightest.

Internships are an excellent way to introduce interested individuals to the functions of a given organization. In a traditional format, they serve as a bridge between academics and the workplace, and there are numerous reasons that the benefits of overseas internships at U.S. embassies would develop better CA personnel. As a current Reserve CA E-7 and State Department Foreign Service Officer (FSO), the author can attest to the large degree of overlap between the CA and DoS/USAID mission set and the striking absence of interagency coordination at the tactical level. Meeting with the Defense Attaché or attending country team meetings are necessary, but they provide insufficient degrees of interaction with the civilian side of the U.S. government (USG) presence overseas—whether it is for coordinating tasks/messaging, fine-tuning an area study, or building contact lists and securing introductions with relevant officials. However, over the course of the author’s two-year assignment in Honduras, the CA unit stationed at an airbase one hour north of the capital never came to meet with the economic or political departments in the Embassy.

Internships would help address this failing. Working with any organization is easier after understanding its internal terminology and procedures. Working in an embassy for a month would give CA Soldiers time to understand how and why cables (reports) are written, how contacts are developed and managed, the different functions of embassy sections and the interplay between Washington and the American diplomatic presence abroad. All of these are valuable lessons that are far easier to learn and internalize through work abroad, as opposed to a PowerPoint presentation at home.

Even more valuable than this deeper understanding is developing social connections between military and civilian professionals that can be tapped as a reach-back resource or “name-dropped” when arriving in a new locale, thereby building an instant social connection with a civilian interlocutor. One thing most Soldiers do not understand well is how small the Foreign Service is and how interpersonal relationships within DoS/USAID are very important. An oft-repeated citation is that there are more bandmembers in the Army than there are FSOs in the DoS. One consequence of this is that befriending a handful of FSOs makes friends-of-friends of the majority of diplomats serving overseas. Just as in any social context, being able to establish a social network is highly valuable toward quickly developing productive professional and institutional relationships. This effect is pronounced at DoS.

Of relevance to the CA Regiment, DoS already recognizes the value of internships. Every year it accepts hundreds of undergraduate juniors and seniors and a smaller number of graduate students to work in Washington, D.C., and in embassies around the world. The system through which applicants nominate their preferred posts and how those posts select and utilize their intern pool already exists. For students, the DoS requires a 10-week commitment, both to ensure that interns get the full experience and to make the investment in their security clearance “worth it” from an organizational perspective. Clearly, the second is not a constraint for CA Soldiers. Pending a discussion between DoD and DoS, the length of the internship is negotiable, although four weeks seems optimal. The author has worked with eight interns over four years in embassies overseas, as well as with two West Point cadets, who attempted—and failed—to grasp embassy life over one week. For a typical intern, the first two weeks are overwhelming, the next two weeks the most rewarding, and the last six weeks, while valuable, show decreasing returns. The majority of interns work during the summer, further complicated by personnel transitions at diplomatic posts. So, an ideal Army program would send Soldiers for
four-week tours in the fall through spring. This would minimize competition with the existing DoS internship program while taking advantage of the extant organizational groundwork.

Initial conversations with the DoS office in charge of coordinating internships— the Office of Recruitment, Examination and Employment (HR/REE)—has raised some concerns that will need to be addressed going forward. The biggest impediment to rapid implementation of a DoD/DoS internship program is that the statute on internships is specifically directed at students enrolled full-time in post-secondary educational institution. DoS also has a standing agreement with other Federal agencies to host exchanges, which would allow GS (government schedule) employees to work at an embassy in a capacity analogous to the internship program. Although many in Reserve CA units would meet one of these requirements, the majority would not. Addressing this “statutory gap” poses an impediment, but HR/REE contacts had no issue with their ability to implement the exchanges as long as the regulatory framework is appropriately applied.

Lessons in the implementation of CA/DoS internships could be applied to other Unified Action partners if the program expanded, for example, for CA functional specialists. Both the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Commerce maintain Foreign Service civil servants; other government departments and U.S. nongovernment organizations (NGOs) would be potential partners. These organizations have experience directly related to CA core tasks and would provide a broadening assignment to CA Soldiers that they could disseminate upon return to their units in addition to helping them during future deployments.

In addition to their clear utility in improving Soldier and unit readiness, internships could be a powerful retention and performance incentive. Many CA Soldiers join the branch because of their interest in development and “less-kinetic” aspects of overseas service. Internships provide that desired experience. With the constant uncertainty surrounding the availability of bonuses, a robust internship program would give unit commanders another, non-monetary (if not for pay, then retirement points) option to meet retention priorities. Internships could also serve as a motivational reward for general performance or as a capstone training/incentive for meeting internal unit training benchmarks. An internship program would also help differentiate CA recruiting by highlighting the multi-disciplinary nature of a military occupational specialty (MOS) when compared to the more typical combat deployment that non-CA Soldiers see as their only overseas experience.

CA fulfills a uniquely strategic role in the Army and internships are uniquely suited to preparing CA Soldiers for full-range deployments. CA could complementing its support of conventional field exercises with time spent working with civilian counterparts overseas. Internships would enhance the ability of CA units to work with country teams and host nation partners, building invaluable social connections with these partners for emerging operations. Just as combat skills cannot be learned solely in a classroom, neither can the multi-disciplinary skillset required of the modern CA Soldier.

Training Reform: Case Studies

CA Soldiers have conducted thousands of projects in a multitude of different situations over the last 100 years, but the current training curriculum does not draw enough from this impressive history. CA training would be significantly improved by including case studies on prior projects—what worked and what did not. Training at the initial MOS course, MOS reclassification and in the noncommissioned officer education system (NCOES) currently teaches through lectures and simulations and, given this foundation, adding case studies would be a valuable
and proven methodological multiplier. Including case studies would expose students to the often-messy constraints that make “real-world” CA so complicated and would expose graduates both to the case-study learning method and the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) as a repository of lessons. Once case studies become normalized in CA, they could be used by units as a readily available resource for follow-on training.

Lectures and simulations are effective in certain areas of teaching, while case studies are more effective in others. Lecture-based instruction is recognized as the most efficient way to introduce ideas, theories, principles, frameworks and concepts to a large number of students. Simulations, which in the CA context include everything from field exercises with role players to iterative project management briefings to cadre, are very effective at forcing Soldiers to apply classroom learning to a real problem. There are downsides to both teaching methods, however. Classroom lectures “do not do enough to encourage creativity, the integrating of functional material, problem-solving, decision-making, risk-taking or interpersonal skills.” This can lead to situations in which Soldiers who are well-versed in FM 3-57 have no ability to apply their knowledge outside of a classroom or testing environment. While an excellent complement to lectures, simulations are very resource-intensive in cadre, role-players and in general environment preparation. Classroom simulations—such as preparing mock presentations for cadre role-playing as supported commanders—are less resource intensive, but the scenarios are often so controlled that CA Soldiers are not challenged to come up with creative solutions. Neither classroom lectures nor simulations devote much time to learning from mistakes: lectures focus on ideal situations and simulations often “reset” if participants stray too far from acceptable norms.

Case studies of real-world successes and failures help to bridge the gap between stale classroom instruction and necessarily-restricted simulations. Harvard Business School uses case studies to “expose students to complex, realistic situations, with an emphasis on decision-making.” Case studies introduce students to constraints that CA practitioners faced in the past, providing a jump-off point for discussion on how those constraints shape the military decision-making process, the project itself and the ultimate outcome and aftermath. Failure is the best teacher, and case studies are an excellent way to learn from previous mistakes. With an initial background reading assignment as homework before the participatory classroom section, case studies can work in as little as one hour, depending on the depth of discussion and number of “lessons” to be learned.

These short training cycles would expose students to constraints that, while mentioned in FM 3-57, are rarely included in field exercises or other simulations because of time. There is value in comparing a series of CA projects with similar goals—such as building schools—that occurred in widely disparate environments ranging from the completely permissive to active war zones, at different levels of support from a strategic geographic combatant command to a tactical brigade combat team, or with disparate funding sources ranging from overseas humanitarian disaster and civic aid to the commander’s emergency response program. Likewise, students could learn valuable lessons about dealing with NGOs, foreign militaries or interagency partners who shape CA projects in ways that are hard to describe in a lecture or FM and hard to simulate in a field exercise. Most important, case studies would allow CA students to learn from the mistakes of other CA practitioners—the main way to make the Regiment a learning organization. CA has been integral to the Army for over 100 years; there is a history of mistakes that modern CA Soldiers could benefit from.

Introducing CA students to the case study learning model would also facilitate future training based on case studies back at home station. Case studies are common in undergraduate or
master’s level coursework, not enjoyed by all enlisted Soldiers. Thus, the best place to ensure a baseline understanding of how to use case studies most effectively would come from exposing new CA Soldiers to this model during initial or reclassification training and then building on that baseline throughout the progression of NCOES schools.

Case studies are an effective pedagogical instrument that expose CA Soldiers to fringe situations that they may encounter in the real world but may never see in training. There is a depth of institutional knowledge at the CALL, and it would be a valuable investment in the future of the CA force if its training incorporated this knowledge more fully.

**Doctrinal Reform: New Core Task List**

Civil affairs operations are doctrinally separated into five core tasks: Population and Resource Control (PRC), Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA), Civil Information Management (CIM), National Assistance (NA), and Support to Civil Authority (SCA). The last two tasks—NA and SCA—are a doctrinal muddle that does nothing to help CA practitioners either internally conceptualize their priorities or explain their capabilities to supported commanders or interagency partners. Core tasks should clearly and succinctly describe what CA can do, a goal that the terms “National Assistance” and “Support to Civil Authority” fail to meet. NA and SCA should be removed from the CA lexicon and replaced by the following three tasks: Security Assistance, Governance Assistance and Direct Military Government. This reform would add terminological clarity to CA activities and help military as well as civilian partners better understand CA capabilities. CA needs to spend its time explaining what it does to support the mission rather than explaining the terms it uses.

As defined in FM 3-57, “NA operations support a HN [host nation] by promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. The goal is to promote long-term regional stability.”10 On the other hand: “SCA are military operations that help to stabilize or to continue the operations of the governing body or civil structure of a foreign country. . . .” There is too much similarity between two ostensibly different core tasks. Indeed, the difference between SCA over an occupied population and SCA to a friendly government is bigger than the difference between friendly SCA and NA.

On review of FM 3-57, it becomes clear that NA exists as a core task not because of some thematic coherence in terms of what it is designed to accomplish on the ground, but instead because each of its subtasks represents a specific pot of money allocated to CA missions by Congress. There is no reason why FHA—a core task—should not include the subtask of Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) that currently falls under NA. Instead, Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and HCA are grouped together; they are subtasks that have very little in common with each other except that they each have dedicated sources of funding. On the other hand, “Support to Civil Administration” is the miscellaneous grab-bag of possible tasks that CA might have to do; despite its wide-ranging purview, the section of text covering it is less than a page long and is woefully short on specifics.

To resolve this problem, replacing the core tasks of NA and SCA by the three “new” tasks mentioned above would resolve this. FHA would inherit the subtask of Humanitarian Civic Assistance, while PRC and CIM would remain unchanged.

“Security Assistance” would inherit the majority of subtasks previously nested under NA. These tasks—SA, FID and the Title 10 USC programs outside of humanitarian assistance—all deal with strengthening or working through local military partners in order to strengthen an
extant friendly government through its security forces. They are also the primary focus of CA during peacetime and the tasks with the least amount of overlap with USG Interagency partners such as USAID.

“Governance Assistance” would encompass aid to friendly governments to support non-military-to-military initiatives that are designed to shore up local government capacity and legitimacy. This would include the focuses of the functional specialties in the CA reserve component: rule-of-law, economic stability, infrastructure, governance, public health and welfare and public education and information.

“Direct Military Government,” on the other hand, would address the situation either after an invasion or state collapse, where CA practitioners had no friendly government structure with whom to work. While the functional areas addressed above would still reflect the priorities of CA forces in theater (just as they reflect the requirements of civilian government in normal times), the fact that they would be performed directly by CA forces is significant and warrants a firm distinction from the more cooperative functions described by “Governance Assistance.”

Increasing the doctrinal clarity of CA core tasks should be a priority going forward. While the terms recommended by the paper may not be the ultimate terminology used, the idea of naming CA core tasks to better reflect their general operational objectives should be the guiding principle. The changes to doctrinal terminology will have a negligible impact on what CA currently does, but it would help conceptualize CA operations internally and explain CA capabilities to supported commanders or unified action partners (UAPs).

Conclusion

CA Soldiers have played an integral role in every conflict that the United States has fought for more than 100 years. The increasingly people-centric nature of war, in which local populations have shifted from being a battlefield obstacle to the decisive center-of-gravity, will only make CA more critical to strategic and operational success going forward. The Army and the nation will require Soldiers who can confidently and competently transition between military commanders, local authorities and civilian partners in the USG interagency, multinational partners and NGOs. Internships for CA personnel at embassies and USAID missions overseas represent a low-cost, high-impact way to prepare them for working with USG diplomatic and development professionals before and not just during conflicts. Increased use of case studies in CA training will facilitate a learning organization and an intellectual culture in which CA Soldiers can leverage centuries of CA experience to prepare for operational complications that are impossible to prepare for with an FM. CA doctrine should also re-focus the CA core tasks towards more goal-focused descriptions: Populace and Resource Control, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, Civil Information Management, Security Assistance, Governance Assistance, and Direct Military Government.

CA has shifted from a supporting function to a decisive effort in many of the conflicts that the United States has been and will be engaged in over the next 100 years. The increasing demand for flexible CA practitioners will require well-rounded Soldiers who are ready to work with UAP’s in dynamic environments and CA doctrine that is clear and accessible to supported commanders and UAP interlocutors. This shift highlights the importance of changes to training and doctrine in the present to prepare CA Soldiers for the undoubted challenges that await them in the future.
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Endnotes


6 E.R. Cadotte, “Business Simulations.”


